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INTENT AND CONSENT IN THE TORT OF 
BATTERY:  CONFUSION AND 
CONTROVERSY 
NANCY J. MOORE* 
    Much of contemporary torts scholarship has been devoted to determining who should 
bear the costs of unintended injury, that is, whether and when defendants should be 
strictly liable for the harm caused by their activities, as opposed to limiting plaintiffs to 
recovery when they can prove that the defendant’s conduct was negligent. 
Comparatively little scholarship has explored the appropriate distinction between the 
intentional torts and the non-intentional torts, such as negligence or strict liability. 
Recently, torts scholars have begun to explore some interesting and unresolved 
questions surrounding the intentional torts, particularly battery, stemming in part 
from the completion of various stages of the Restatement (Third) of Torts and the 
current position of the ALI that it will not attempt a restatement of the non-economic 
intentional torts that were addressed in great detail in the Restatement (Second) on the 
grounds that intentional tort doctrine is clear and that the Restatement (Second) 
provisions have been widely adopted. 
    This Article joins the work of several torts scholars who have recently questioned the 
clarity of intentional tort law doctrine.  These scholars have focused on the ambiguity 
of the Restatement (Second) provisions with respect to the intent to cause a harmful or 
offensive bodily contact, that is, whether these provisions require both intent to cause 
bodily contact and intent to cause harm or offense (dual intent) or whether it is 
sufficient that the defendant intends a bodily contact that turns out to be either 
harmful or offensive (single intent). Some of these scholars have also suggested that the 
essence of battery is not the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, but rather 
the intent to cause an unpermitted contact. 
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    This Article demonstrates that the current confusion and controversy over battery 
law doctrine is far more extensive than even these recent torts scholars have 
demonstrated.  It extends beyond the element of intent and includes uncertainty 
concerning the role of the plaintiff’s lack of actual or apparent consent---that is, 
whether consent is an affirmative defense or whether lack of consent is an element of 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case---and the relationship between intent and lack of 
consent.  Moreover, this confusion and controversy is reflected not only in modern 
battery court opinions, but also in the cursory and contradictory treatment given to 
battery law in most torts casebooks and treatises.  Finally, despite the ALI’s assumption 
that the Restatement (Second) provisions have been widely adopted, there are many 
jurisdictions where courts are formulating battery doctrine using terminology that 
departs significantly from the Restatement (Second) provisions. 
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Much of contemporary torts law scholarship has been devoted to 
determining who should bear the costs of unintended injury, that is, 
whether and when defendants should be strictly liable for the harm 
caused by their activities, as opposed to limiting plaintiffs to recovery 
when they can prove that the defendant’s conduct was negligent.1  
Comparatively little scholarship has explored the appropriate 
distinction between the intentional torts, such as battery, assault, and 
false imprisonment, and the non-intentional torts, such as the 
negligent infliction of physical or emotional harm and strict liability 
for defective products and abnormally dangerous activities.  Recently, 
however, torts scholars have begun to explore some interesting and 
unresolved questions surrounding the intentional torts, particularly 
battery.  These inquiries stem, at least in part, from the completion of 
various stages of the Restatement (Third) of Torts2 (Third 
Restatement) and the current position of the American Law Institute 
(ALI) that it will not attempt a new Restatement of the non-economic 
intentional torts.3  The ALI’s position rests on the ground that these 
torts were addressed in great detail in the Restatement (Second) of 
                                                          
 1. See, e.g., Symposium, Calabresi’s The Costs of Accidents:  A Generation of Impact 
on Law and Scholarship, 64 MD. L. REV. 1 (2005) (devoting an entire law review issue to 
analyzing the impact of Professor Guido Calabresi’s application of economic theory 
to the law of accidents). 
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
(2010).  For a brief discussion of the completed or nearly completed stages of the 
Third Restatement, see AM. LAW INST., A CONCISE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, at ix–x 
(Ellen M. Bublick ed., 2d ed. 2010).  In addition, the ALI is currently working on a 
phase of the project concerning economic torts.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
LIAB. FOR ECON. HARM (Preliminary Draft No. 1, 2011). 
 3. Although the Third Restatement defines “intent,” it does not address what 
consequences need to have been intended for any specific intentional tort, referring 
to the Second Restatement for those details.  See Joseph H. King, The Torts 
Restatement’s Inchoate Definition of Intent for Battery, and Reflections on the Province of 
Restatements, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 623, 624 (2011). At one time, it appeared possible that 
the ALI might include an additional project on the intentional personal torts, see id. 
at 625 n.8; however, it is now clear that the project will be completed without any 
attempt to restate the substantive requirements of the non-economic intentional 
torts.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM xi-
xii (2010) (describing contents of completed first volume and projected second and 
final volume). 
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Torts4 (Second Restatement) and that the Second Restatement 
“remains largely authoritative in explaining the details of the specific 
[intentional] torts . . . and in specifying the elements and limits of the 
various affirmative defenses that might be available.”5  Several torts 
scholars have criticized or questioned this decision, noting the extent 
to which intentional tort doctrine is far less clear than the ALI 
apparently believes it is,6 as well as the potential benefits of extending 
the Third Restatement’s search for broader principles, as opposed to 
detailed rules, to intentional tort law doctrine.7 
In particular, several torts scholars have recently debated the 
question of whether battery does (and should) require both intent to 
cause a bodily contact and intent to cause either harm or offense 
(“dual intent”) or whether it is sufficient that the defendant intends a 
bodily contact that turns out to be either harmful or offensive 
(“single intent”).8  In addition, some have argued that the essence of 
battery is not the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, but 
rather the intent to cause an unpermitted contact,9  thereby raising 
questions concerning the precise nature of the relationship between 
the defendant’s intent and the plaintiff’s lack of consent.  Finally, 
torts scholars have debated the question of whether a physician 
should be held liable in battery, as opposed to negligence, for 
medical treatment that the physician honestly, but mistakenly, 
believes has been authorized by the patient.10  These currently 
unresolved issues present fundamental questions concerning the 
                                                          
 4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). 
 5. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 5 
cmt. a (2010); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 5 
cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“[T]here is a scarcity of judicial opinions 
that have seriously called into question any of those doctrines.”). 
 6. See, e.g., King, supra note 3, at 624 (expressing disappointment that the ALI 
did not address what level of intent is necessary to expose an actor to liability for 
intentional torts, such as battery); Kenneth W. Simons, A Restatement (Third) of 
Intentional Torts?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1062–63 (2006) (suggesting that “the new 
Restatement might intelligently respond” to the complexity of intentional torts that 
remains unaddressed). 
 7. See Ellen M. Bublick, A Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Liability for Intentional 
Harm to Persons—Thoughts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1335, 1335–36 (2009) (proposing 
that a new Restatement might present an opportunity to craft a more “principled 
and useful . . . structure”). 
 8. See King, supra note 3, at 629–38; Craig M. Lawson, The Puzzle of Intended Harm 
in the Tort of Battery, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 355, 356 (2001); Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., 
Tortious Battery:  Is “I Didn’t Mean Any Harm” Relevant?, 37 OKLA. L. REV. 717, 723–24 
(1984); Simons, supra note 6, at 1066–70. 
 9. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 52–53 (2000) [hereinafter 
DOBBS, HORNBOOK] (footnotes omitted); Lawson, supra note 8, at 368.  
 10. See, e.g., King, supra note 3, at 638–41; Lawson, supra note 8 at 368–70; see also 
Simons, supra note 6, at 1071–76. 
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nature of intentional torts and their relationship to other forms of 
tort liability. 
Current torts law casebooks devote considerably less space to 
intentional torts than to non-intentional torts.  This dynamic is 
certainly understandable, given both the greater frequency with 
which claims are made under either negligence or strict liability11 and 
the general lack of interest among contemporary torts law scholars 
concerning the intentional torts.  What is less understandable, 
however, is the extent to which the treatment of intentional torts, 
such as battery, in most of these casebooks fails to accurately convey 
either the existence of unresolved issues concerning basic doctrine 
(such as the debate between single and dual intent and the unclear 
relationship between intent and consent) or the extent to which 
many modern torts opinions do not follow the Second Restatement’s 
formulation of the prima facie case, but rather formulate the 
doctrine in a variety of ways, each of which raises its own questions 
concerning the application of the stated doctrine to particular cases.  
Similarly, standard secondary sources such as hornbooks and treatises 
typically fail to accurately convey the current confusion and 
controversy in tort law doctrine with respect to such intentional torts 
as battery.  
 Consider how some of the leading torts casebooks treat the 
question of intent in the law of battery.  Two popular casebooks offer 
only minimal treatment of the intentional trespassory torts, including 
battery.12  As a result, it is not surprising that they make no attempt to 
alert students to the complexities of the concept of intent or to the 
disagreement among courts and commentators concerning the 
object of the required element of intent.13  Another casebook begins 
                                                          
 11. Aside from the likely greater incidence of harm resulting from inadvertence, 
as opposed to intentional misconduct, the fact that liability insurance contracts 
typically cover only accidents easily explains why more claims would be filed alleging 
negligence or strict liability rather than intentional harm.  See MARC A. FRANKLIN ET 
AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 903–04 (9th ed. 2011) (discussing the application of 
insurance provisions that purport to exclude certain intentional conduct). 
 12. See id. at 897–924; HARRY SHULMAN ET AL., LAW OF TORTS:  CASES AND 
MATERIALS ch. 13 (5th ed. 2010). Both casebooks devote a single chapter to the 
traditional intentional torts (excluding defamation, privacy and the economic torts), 
including defenses and privileges, and those chapters appear toward the end of the 
casebooks, rather than at the beginning 
 13. The Shulman casebook contains only two cases on the prima facie case in 
battery, neither of which clearly raises the question whether battery requires an 
intent to harm or offend.  SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 12,  at 763–69 (covering 
Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955), and Manning v. Grimsley, 643 F.2d 20 
(1st Cir. 1981)).  The casebook provides the relevant black-letter provisions of the 
Second Restatement, but does not give any indication that they may be ambiguous in 
application.  Id. at 766–67.  Moreover, the notes prominently quote the draft Third 
Restatement’s explanation that litigation concerning intentional torts is uncommon 
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with the intentional torts, devotes considerable attention to them, but 
then fails to clearly address the distinction between single and dual 
intent.14  Several casebooks expressly acknowledge that there are 
diverging views with respect to dual and single intent.15  However, 
these casebooks then either fail to provide any meaningful 
information as to how the issue is addressed by the Second 
                                                          
and “there is a scarcity of judicial opinions that have seriously called into question 
any of those doctrines [concerning intentionally caused physical harm].”  Id. at 767 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 5 cmt. c 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005)).  The Franklin casebook contains three cases on 
the prima facie case of battery, including Garratt v. Dailey, which focuses primarily on 
the result requirement rather than the intent requirement.  FRANKLIN ET AL., supra 
note 11, at 898–911.  The notes following the cases ask what precisely the defendant 
must have intended, but without giving any guidance that suggests the recognized 
distinction in some cases between single and dual intent.  Id. at 901. 
 14. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS:  CASES 
AND MATERIALS 17–41 (12th ed. 2010).  The casebook includes seven principal cases 
on the prima facie case of battery, with extensive notes.  One of the principal cases, 
Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1972), requires intent to harm, id. at 817, 
which is a dual intent standard.  A note following Spivey describes the opinion in 
Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599 (Utah 2005), as holding that “battery require[s] only 
acting with intent to cause contact that [i]s harmful or offensive, not acting with 
intent to cause harm,” which is a single intent standard.  SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra, at 
23.  The note, however, fails to either acknowledge or comment on the different 
intent standards adopted in the principal and the note cases; moreover, it does not 
raise any questions concerning possible reasons underlying the different standards.  
Indeed, several pages later, the casebook authors include as another principal case 
the opinion in McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760 (Mass. 1937), which held both that 
“[m]entally disabled persons may be held responsible for their intentional torts as 
long as the plaintiff can prove that they formed the requisite intent” and that “the 
jury could find that the defendant [here] was capable of entertaining and that she 
did entertain an intent to strike and to injure the plaintiff and that she acted on that 
intent,” thereby adopting what appears to be a dual intent standard.  SCHWARTZ ET 
AL., supra, at 27.  The notes following McGuire do not mention the previously noted 
contrary holding in Wagner, which was also a case involving a mental patient.  
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra, at 27–28. 
 15. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 8–9 (9th ed. 2008) 
(explaining that different views of intent applied to the same fact pattern could 
result in divergent conclusions); JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW:  
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 577 (2d ed. 2008) (hypothesizing that courts justify the 
qualification of the black letter law of intent by distinguishing tort law from criminal 
law); AARON D. TWERSKI & JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., TORTS:  CASES AND MATERIALS 7–9 
(2d ed. 2008) (discussing inconsistent approaches to the same rule).  Two other 
casebooks raise the issue only indirectly.  See WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, 
TORTS:  CASES AND QUESTIONS 4–5 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH & GRADY, 
CASEBOOK] (asking whether the Second Restatement’s provisions on intent are 
consistent with the cases described, including the well-known 1891 opinion in Vosburg 
v. Putney, 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891), in which the defendant was held liable for 
unforeseeable bodily harm despite a lack of intent to injure because he intended “an 
unlawful act”); JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 13–15 (7th ed. 
2007) (presenting the opinion in Vosburg and acknowledging that the concept of 
intent can present difficulties); HENDERSON ET AL., supra, at 34 (revisiting Vosburg 
after introducing the Second Restatement provisions, suggesting that it might be 
explained by the defendant’s intent to cause offensive contact, and asking whether 
the Second Restatement requires such an intent to offend, but failing to mention 
modern cases addressing that very question with contrary results). 
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Restatement,16 or leave the misleading impression either that the 
Second Restatement clearly requires dual intent17 or that it clearly 
requires only single intent.18  Only one casebook—Dobbs, Hayden, 
and Bublick’s Torts and Compensation:  Personal Accountability and Social 
Responsibility for Injury19—prominently includes modern decisions on 
both sides of the issue, acknowledges the ambiguity of the Second 
Restatement provisions, and provides more than a passing reference 
to the competing policy concerns raised by the debate.20  Not 
surprisingly, Professor Dobbs appears to be the only treatise author 
who provides a similarly complete picture of the debate over single 
versus dual intent.21 
The casebook authors agree that the intent to make some sort of 
bodily contact is an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.22  The 
casebooks diverge, however, on whether a plaintiff’s actual or 
apparent consent is an affirmative defense or whether lack of consent 
                                                          
 16. See, e.g., TWERSKI & HENDERSON, supra note 15, at 7–8 (citing the contrary 
decisions in White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814 (Colo. 2000), and White v. Univ. of Idaho, 
797 P.2d 108 (Idaho 1990), and engaging the co-authors in a brief debate about 
possible reasons to prefer one position over the other, but failing to address 
ambiguity of the Second Restatement provisions). 
 17. See EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 9 (explaining the result in White v. University of 
Idaho, which requires only single intent, by its refusal to adopt the Second 
Restatement, thereby suggesting that the decision is a likely outlier on this issue). 
 18. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 566–78 (reproducing the opinion in 
Wagner v. State, in which the court interpreted the Second Restatement as clearly 
requiring only single intent, without further indicating that there are both cases and 
commentators that interpret the Second Restatement as requiring dual intent and 
without acknowledging that the Second Restatement’s provisions may be 
ambiguous).  The authors do at least note that another opinion, White v. Muniz, 
rejects single intent, although the authors do not further explain that the Muniz 
court interpreted the Second Restatement provisions differently from the court in 
Wagner.  Id. at 577; see also ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW:  CASES, 
STATUTES, AND PROBLEMS 31–36 (2d ed. 2007) (acknowledging the conflicting 
approaches taken in White v. Muniz and White v. University of Idaho, but failing to raise 
the ambiguity of the Second Restatement provisions); cf. DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 17 (4th ed. 2011) (raising the question of whether 
battery requires intent to touch or intent to harm or offend, citing cases on both 
sides, but failing to address the Second Restatement provisions). 
 19. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION:  PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter DOBBS, CASEBOOK]. 
 20. Id. at 48–52 (engaging the reader to see the differences created by each 
approach). 
 21. See DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 58–61 (addressing the ambiguity 
and presenting arguments in favor of each approach); see also 1 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., 
THE LAW OF TORTS § 94, at 87–94 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter DOBBS, PRACTITIONER 
TREATISE] (citing recent cases and responding to an article written by torts professor 
Kenneth W. Simons on the topic of dual versus single intent). 
 22. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 904 (highlighting the Garratt 
court’s definition of battery as “the intentional infliction of a harmful bodily contact 
upon another” (quoting Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Wash. 1955))); 
SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 767 (providing the Second Restatement’s 
formulation of battery as requiring a “direct[] or indirect[]” contact (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13(b) (1965))). 
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is a part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.  Many of the casebooks 
present consent as an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and 
proved by the defendant.23  Other casebooks observe that some 
courts treat consent as an affirmative defense, while others treat the 
absence of consent as an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.24  
A few casebooks note the possibility that the plaintiff’s consent might 
negate the offensiveness of a touching, thereby having an effect on 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case even when consent is otherwise viewed 
as an affirmative defense,25 and at least one casebook observes that 
some courts go so far as to define the prima facie case for some 
intentional torts, including battery, as a nonconsensual invasion of 
the particular interest at stake.26  Casebooks that recognize the 
possibility of both a dual intent rule and consent as an affirmative 
defense fail to explain how there can be intent to cause an offensive 
contact if the defendant believes the plaintiff is consenting.27  Even 
casebooks that note the absence of consent as a possible element of 
the plaintiff’s prima facie case fail to address the question of whether 
the defendant must knowingly deviate from the plaintiff’s actual or 
apparent consent or whether it is sufficient that the defendant has an 
                                                          
 23. See, e.g., FRANKLIN ET AL., supra note 11, at 946–49 (including consent as one 
of several defenses to intentional torts); ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 47 
(stating that most courts treat consent as a defense to be pleaded and proved by the 
defendant); see also HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 41, 65 (treating consent as an 
affirmative defense, but later suggesting that whether a contact is offensive may 
depend on whether the plaintiff has apparently consented to it). 
 24. See, e.g., BEST & BARNES, supra note 18, at 52; GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, 
at 587–88; cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 35–37 (addressing consent under the section 
heading entitled “Consensual Defenses,” but then mentioning in a note, without 
further explanation, “the conventional view that the absence of consent is a matter 
essential to the cause of action, and it is uniformly held that it must be proved by the 
plaintiff as a necessary part of his case” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
13 cmt. d (1965) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 25. See, e.g., DOBBS, CASEBOOK, supra note 19, at 88 (discussing the “‘defense’ of 
consent” and asking, “[i]s consent really a ‘defense’?”); FARNSWORTH & GRADY, 
CASEBOOK, supra note 15, at 16 (“Sometimes a defendant will offer a plaintiff’s 
consent as an affirmative defense, or a ‘privilege’ . . . .  We discuss consent in this 
section [on the prima facie case] because it is closely connected to the question of 
whether a touching is harmful or offensive in the first place.”); HENDERSON ET AL., 
supra note 15, at 65 (stating that whether a contact is offensive may depend on 
whether the plaintiff has apparently consented to it). 
 26. See ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 47 (citing cases where battery is 
defined as an unpermitted or nonconsensual intentional invasion of the plaintiff’s 
person); see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, at 587–88 (“Given that torts such as 
battery concern, at their core, the subjection of another to unwanted touchings, etc., 
it is perhaps not surprising that the issue of consent is sometimes singled out for this 
special treatment [of treating absence of consent as part of the prima facie case].”). 
 27. See, e.g., BEST & BARNES, supra note 18, at 35–36; id. at 52 (noting the dispute 
over the role of consent as a defense or part of plaintiff’s case, without 
acknowledging the difficulties of applying the dual intent rule when consent is an 
affirmative defense). 
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honest but unreasonable belief in the plaintiff’s consent.28 
What is at stake here with respect to the appropriate formulation of 
an action in battery?  After all, there are many situations in which 
conduct that does not constitute a battery may nevertheless subject 
the defendant to liability in negligence.  But that is not always the 
case.  For example, when the intended contact is merely offensive 
and the resulting physical harm is entirely unforeseeable, there is 
probably no action available in negligence,29 although there may be 
liability for an offensive battery.  Even when there is potential liability 
in negligence, there are numerous practical consequences of 
determining that the defendant acted negligently rather than 
intentionally.  For example, insurance coverage,30 governmental 
immunities,31 and workers’ compensation32 often turn on the 
question of whether the victim’s injury was the result of intentional 
conduct.  Aside from such ancillary questions—the answers to which 
need not necessarily dovetail with the precise details of battery 
doctrine33—labeling conduct as a battery currently results in other 
practical consequences, such as the inapplicability of the defense of 
                                                          
 28. See infra note 370 (raising this issue squarely in some medical battery cases, in 
which some courts have held that only intentional deviations from authorized 
treatment can be considered batteries); see also infra Part V (expounding upon the 
issue of consent in the medical battery context).  Hornbooks and treatises are not 
much more illuminating on the subject.  For example, Professor Dobbs believes that 
“the gist of battery is that the plaintiff has been touched, intentionally, in a way that 
she has not even apparently consented to,” DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 29, at 
55, but he does not explain how courts would analyze a case involving a defendant 
who honestly, but mistakenly, believes that the plaintiff consented, other than to 
state that “the plaintiff’s apparent consent shows that the defendant is not intending 
to touch in an offensive way,” id. § 29, at 56.  But that statement appears to be 
inconsistent with the dual intent rule, which Professor Dobbs both prefers and 
believes to be the rule adopted by most courts.  Id. § 29, at 58. 
 29. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18(2) (1965) (“An act which is not 
done with the intention [to cause a harmful or offensive contact] does not make the 
actor liable to the other for a mere offensive contact with the other’s person 
although the act involves an unreasonable risk of inflicting it and, therefore, would 
be negligent or reckless if the risk threatened bodily harm.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Clayburn v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 871 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489 
(App. Div. 2009); Baldinger v. Consol. Mut. Ins. Co., 222 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737 (App. 
Div. 1961), aff’d, 183 N.E.2d 908 (N.Y. 1962); see also Non-Marine Underwriters v. 
Scalera, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 551, para. 7 (Can.) (interpreting an insurance contract 
containing an exclusion clause for intentionally caused wrongs). 
 31. See, e.g., Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 400 (1988) (finding a claim 
barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act’s intentional tort exception—even though 
the claim was filed as a negligence claim—because that claim ultimately arose from a 
battery); Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599, 610 (Utah 2005) (affirming dismissal of a 
negligence action on the ground that an attack constituted a battery and the State 
was immune from lawsuit in battery). 
 32. See, e.g., Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 392 (La. 1987) (finding that an 
electric shock administered by the plaintiff’s employer was an intentional tort and 
therefore was not covered by the worker’s compensation statute). 
 33. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 6, at 1096–97. 
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comparative negligence, which significantly distinguish battery from 
negligence.34  As a result, the doctrinal label is an important one for 
both plaintiff and defendant. 
Even so, it might be the case, as some recent commentators have 
acknowledged, that except for a handful of cases involving young 
children or adult defendants with seriously diminished mental 
capacity, courts may reach pretty much the same results regarding 
what conduct constitutes a battery, regardless of whether they 
purport to apply the single intent rule or the dual intent rule.35  
Similarly, there may be only a few battery cases in which it matters 
who bears the burden of proving consent or lack of consent.36  Of 
course, it is difficult to tell if a case would have turned out 
differently—either at the trial37 or the appellate level—depending on 
the precise formulation of both the elements of the prima facie case 
and the identification of who has the burden of proof of consent.  
And in cases involving medical batteries, it could make a great deal of 
difference whether battery is limited to intentional unauthorized 
treatment or whether it includes an honest but unreasonable belief in 
the plaintiff’s consent.38 
Even if there is not a great deal at stake from a practical 
standpoint, I believe that doctrine matters and that, whenever 
possible, both courts and commentators should attempt to 
understand and explain as clearly as possible why battery and other 
intentional tort cases come out the way they do.  Indeed, one of the 
primary purposes of the Restatements is to clarify and simplify the law 
when it is otherwise confusing and overly complex.39  In any event, 
neither beginning law students nor experienced lawyers should be 
                                                          
 34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 1 cmt. c 
(2000) (“Although some courts have held that a plaintiff’s negligence may serve as a 
comparative defense to an intentional tort, most have not.”). 
 35. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 8, at 375 (suggesting that although changing the 
definition “of intent in the tort of battery—intent to act without permission—might 
alter the elements of battery, it would probably not change the result in many 
cases”); see also Simons, supra note 6, at 1070. 
 36. See BEST & BARNES supra note 18, at 52 (discussing the dispute over whether 
consent is a defense or lack of consent is an element of the prima facie case and 
stating that “[t]here have not been enough reported cases where the evidence of 
consent is in equipoise for the law of all the state to be clear and in agreement on 
this point”). 
 37. Cf. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 35 (3d ed. 
2007) (explaining that the difference in alternative formulations of consent will be 
reflected primarily in jury instructions). 
 38. See infra Part V (discussing the difference between cases where a physician 
deliberately deviates from the patient’s wishes and instances where a physician 
reasonably believes the patient consented to the course of treatment). 
 39. See, e.g., King, supra note 3, at 650–53 (noting the ALI’s conclusion that the 
major shortcomings of American law are its complexity and uncertainty). 
MOORE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:20 PM 
2012] INTENT AND CONSENT IN THE TORT OF BATTERY 1595 
misled into thinking that modern intentional torts such as battery are 
relatively simple and straightforward or that the Second Restatement 
clearly articulates the doctrine as it has been applied by a majority of 
courts. 
This Article focuses more attention on the special problems posed 
by intentional torts, particularly battery.  It addresses not only the 
debate between single and dual intent (as well as some competing 
formulations of the intent requirement), but also the difficulty of 
determining the proper relationship between the element of intent 
and the requirement that there be a lack of consent on the part of 
the plaintiff.  Part I gives a more detailed account of the current 
confusion and controversy concerning the identification of the 
elements of a prima facie case in battery.  Part II provides a brief 
account of the historical development of the modern tort of battery, 
which is necessary to understanding why it is that so many courts do 
not follow the Second Restatement’s formulation of the elements of a 
prima facie case in battery and how these courts came to adopt a 
variety of different and sometimes contradictory formulations.  Part 
III analyzes the ambiguity of the relevant Second Restatement 
provisions, rejecting the argument of some torts scholars that only 
the single intent rule can explain the apparently uniform results in 
certain kinds of cases, such as those involving practical jokers and 
those involving physicians and other persons whose purpose is to 
help, not to harm or offend.  This Part argues that these cases are 
better explained by acknowledging that certain medical procedures, 
such as operations, necessarily involve harmful contacts (even when 
ultimately beneficial) and that physicians and others often know that, 
in the absence of consent, certain bodily touchings will be offensive.  
By clearly separating the elements of intent and absence of consent, 
satisfaction of the intent element of battery is easily explained under 
both single and dual intent rules, thereby leaving resolution of these 
cases to a determination whether the defendant should be relieved of 
liability on the ground of actual or apparent consent.  Part IV 
addresses the relevant policy considerations associated with choosing 
between single and dual intent, considerations that necessarily 
require a discussion of the appropriate distinctions between 
intentional and non-intentional torts.  It concludes that there is no 
justification for preferring the single intent rule and thereby 
departing from the moral fault principle that underlies much of 
modern tort law.  It also rejects the argument from some recent tort 
scholars that the principle of “bodily integrity” demands fuller 
protection than that afforded under the dual intent rule.  Part V 
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addresses the special problem of consent in medical cases in which 
the physician honestly, but mistakenly, believes that the patient has 
consented to the treatment provided.  It agrees with the current 
majority rule that physicians should not be liable in battery (as 
opposed to negligence) unless they knowingly depart from the 
patient’s wishes, but then argues that this result is a clear departure 
from traditional consent doctrine and should, for the most part, be 
limited to medical cases.  The Article concludes by proposing, at least 
in concept, how a Third Restatement might best formulate 
intentional tort doctrine in cases involving either harmful or 
offensive battery. 
I. ELEMENTS OF A PRIMA FACIE CASE IN BATTERY 
In order to prevail on a tort theory, the plaintiff must plead and 
prove the elements of a prima facie case, which are different for each 
individual tort, such as battery, assault, negligence, strict liability for 
defective products, or strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities.  The defendant may prevail either by challenging the 
plaintiff’s ability to establish a prima facie case or by pleading and 
proving one of a number of affirmative defenses (or privileges), 
which differ according to which individual tort the plaintiff is 
pursuing.  For example, contributory or comparative negligence is a 
defense to negligence, but not to the intentional torts of assault or 
battery,40 for which the defendant might claim self-defense or defense 
of others.41 
A. Battery Defined:  The Second Restatement 
According to the Second Restatement, there are two forms of 
battery:  one that results in a harmful bodily contact and another that 
results in an offensive bodily contact.42  Although different with 
respect to the result, they are defined identically with respect to the 
other elements of the prima facie case.  For example, battery 
involving harmful bodily contact is defined in section 13 as follows: 
An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if 
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or 
                                                          
 40. Bublick, supra note 7, at 1348–49. 
 41. See DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 68, at 155–56 (offering examples of 
privileges and defenses that defeat a claim, including the privilege of self-defense). 
 42. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1965) (“An actor is subject to 
liability to another for battery if . . . a harmful contact . . . results.” (emphasis added)), 
with id. § 18 (“An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if . . . an offensive 
contact . . . results.” (emphasis added)). 
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offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or 
an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and 
(b) a harmful contact with person of the other directly or indirectly 
results.43 
Battery involving offensive bodily contact is defined identically in 
section 18, except that paragraph (b) substitutes “offensive” for 
“harmful” with respect to the resulting contact.44  In other words, 
combining the two forms, battery requires that the defendant 
perform:  (1) an act, (2) with the intent “to cause a harmful or 
offensive [bodily] contact” (or the imminent apprehension of such a 
contact),45 (3) that directly or indirectly causes, (4) a harmful or 
offensive bodily contact.46  Intent is defined in section 8A “to denote 
that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he 
believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from 
it.”47 
B. Court Decisions Interpreting Intent 
A few courts and commentators have recently debated the question 
of whether the Second Restatement’s definition of intent is properly 
interpreted to require both intent to make a bodily contact and, in 
addition, intent to harm or offend (dual intent), or whether it is 
sufficient that the defendant intends to make a bodily contact that 
turns out to be harmful or offensive (single intent).  In the 1990 case 
of White v. University of Idaho,48 the Supreme Court of Idaho held that 
battery does not require the intent to harm or offend,49  but the court 
refused to determine which position the Second Restatement had 
                                                          
 43. Id. § 13. 
 44. Id. § 18(1) (“An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if . . . (b) an 
offensive contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results.”). 
 45. Except in referring to the doctrine of transferred intent, see infra note 46, I 
will ignore, for the remainder of this Article, the intent to cause “imminent 
apprehension” of a harmful or offensive bodily contact as satisfying the intent 
element of either harmful or offensive battery.  It is cumbersome and, in any event, 
the same issue of single versus dual intent arises in the interpretation of what it 
means to intend apprehension of a harmful or offensive bodily contact. 
 46. The use of identical intent requirements, thereby treating as equivalent the 
intent to cause either a harmful contact or an offensive contact or merely 
apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive contact, reflects one aspect of the 
doctrine of “transferred intent,” under which courts extend liability in trespassory 
torts for unintended consequences; liability is extended when offense is intended 
with resulting harm “or vice versa,” and when the tortious conduct is directed at one 
person but unexpectedly affects another person.  See DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 
9, § 40, at 75. 
 47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
 48. 797 P.2d 108 (Idaho 1990). 
 49. Id. at 111 (affirming the lower court’s ruling that battery “did not require an 
intent to injure or harm, but merely an intent to do the act complained of”). 
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adopted because Idaho does not follow the Restatement.50  In 1995, 
in Brzoska v. Olson,51 the Supreme Court of Delaware interpreted the 
Second Restatement’s definition of battery to require only “the intent 
to make contact with the person, not the intent to cause harm,” 
thereby implying—although not expressly stating—that the plaintiff 
also need not prove an intent to cause even offensive contact if the 
intended contact turned out to be either harmful or offensive.52  It 
was not until 2000 that a court squarely addressed the question of 
whether the Second Restatement definitions of battery require dual 
or single intent.  In White v. Muniz,53 the Supreme Court of Colorado 
interpreted section 18 of the Second Restatement to require dual 
intent, claiming that “[h]istorically, the intentional tort of battery 
required a subjective desire on the part of the tortfeasor to inflict a 
harmful or offensive contact on another.”54  By contrast, in the 2005 
decision in Wagner v. State,55 the Supreme Court of Utah interpreted 
the Second Restatement’s definition to require only that the 
defendant intended to touch the person of another and that the 
touching was a harmful or offensive one at law.56 
Although in Muniz, the court believed that dual intent was 
historically required,57 it appears that the question had not previously 
been raised in a court on precisely those terms, with the exception of 
University of Idaho.58  Indeed, after Muniz, and in direct contrast to 
that court’s view of the history of intent in the law of battery, the 
Supreme Court of Utah in Wagner claimed that the single intent rule 
had been adopted in the majority of cases in both federal and state 
courts.59 
A close examination of the case law reveals many opinions that 
appear to have adopted either the dual or single intent rule, but not 
clearly so and often in the context of addressing a somewhat different 
                                                          
 50. See id. at 111 n.3 (declining to “attempt[] to unravel which position the 
Restatement (Second) ultimately embraces—for it could be interpreted as 
supporting either position”). 
 51. 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995). 
 52. Id. at 1360. 
 53. 999 P.2d 814 (Colo. 2000). 
 54. Id. at 816 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)). 
 55. 122 P.3d 599 (Utah 2005). 
 56. Id. at 603. 
 57. Muniz, 999 P.2d at 816. 
 58. See White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108, 109 (Idaho 1990) (“[T]he intent 
required for the commission of a battery is simply the intent to cause an unpermitted 
contact not an intent that the contact be harmful or offensive.”). 
 59. Wagner 122 P.3d at 606 (asserting that the plaintiff’s theory of dual intent is 
“in conflict with the majority of case law on the subject in both federal and state 
courts”). 
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question.  For example, in Andrews v. Peters,60 the defendant tapped 
the back of the plaintiff co-worker’s knee with his own knee, resulting 
in the plaintiff’s fall and dislocation of her right kneecap.61  The 
defendant testified that he did not intend to be rude or offensive, 
and that the same thing had just been done to him by another co-
worker and it had “struck him as fun.”62  The Court of Appeals of 
North Carolina upheld a verdict for the plaintiff, stating that the 
contact was clearly offensive and that the jury had found that the 
defendant intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact.63  The 
opinion is vague, but it appears to endorse a dual intent requirement 
by implying that the jury had rejected the defendant’s testimony that 
he intended no harm or offense.64  Similarly, in Labadie v. Semler,65 the 
Court of Appeals of Ohio found that the defendant seventeen-year-
old committed a battery when he picked up a snowball and threw it at 
the plaintiff’s car after the plaintiff had pulled up in front of the 
defendant’s house and yelled obscenities at the defendant’s mother.66  
Relying on the Second Restatement’s definition of battery, the court 
appeared to endorse the dual intent requirement, stating that the 
defendant “at the very least, intended to put [the plaintiff] ‘in 
apprehension of either a harmful or offensive bodily contact.’”67  In 
Labadie, it seemed clear that the defendant intended to either harm 
or offend the plaintiff, although the court was perhaps more focused 
on the possibility that the defendant had intended only to scare the 
plaintiff without necessarily intending to hit her with the snowball.68 
Other opinions appear to have endorsed the single intent rule, 
although the circumstances were such that the dual intent rule was 
                                                          
 60. 330 S.E.2d 638 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), aff’d, 347 S.E.2d 409 (N.C. 1986). 
 61. Id. at 639. 
 62. Id. at 640. 
 63. Id. at 641. 
 64. See id. (implying that the jury’s verdict finding the defendant liable 
necessarily entailed a finding that the defendant’s touch was intended to be harmful 
or offensive). 
 65. 585 N.E.2d 862 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam). 
 66. Id. at 863 (reversing the trial court’s verdict that the defendant was merely 
negligent). 
 67. Id. at 864 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965)). 
 68. Id. at 863–64 (observing that the defendant, “an accomplished high school 
athlete in football and baseball,” threw a snowball at plaintiff’s open window from 
ten to fifteen feet away and therefore “at the very least” intended to scare the 
plaintiff).  In Snyder v. Turk, 627 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993), the defendant 
surgeon, who had become frustrated during an operation when the plaintiff scrub 
nurse handed him the wrong instrument, grabbed the plaintiff by her shoulder and 
pulled her face down toward the surgical opening.  Id. at 1055.  There the court said 
that reasonable minds could conclude that the defendant intended to commit an 
offensive contact, implying that the jury could find that he had the intent to offend, 
as well as to cause the contact itself.  Id. at 1057. 
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probably satisfied, and the court may have been addressing an 
entirely different issue.  For example, in Mink v. University of Chicago,69 
the pregnant plaintiffs were administered the drug DES without 
being told either that they were being given the drug or that they 
were part of a medical experiment.70  The district court for the 
Northern District of Illinois said that “the plaintiffs need show only 
intent to bring about the contact,” but the focus of the opinion was 
the rejection of any requirement that the plaintiff prove intent to 
harm.71  The court concluded that the administration of a drug 
without the patient’s knowledge was clearly an offensive contact, 
something that the defendants certainly must have known.72  
Similarly, in Masters v. Becker,73 the nine-year-old defendant pried the 
plaintiff’s fingers off the tailgate of a truck on which they were 
playing in order to get her turn on the ledge, causing the plaintiff to 
fall to the ground and sustain severe injuries.74  The New York 
appellate court suggested that the single intent rule applied, stating 
that the plaintiff “must prove only that there was bodily contact; that 
such contact was offensive; and that the defendant intended to make 
the contact.”75  The circumstances, however, were such that the 
defendant must have known that the contact would be offensive, and 
the court was primarily concerned, as was the Mink court, with 
explaining that the plaintiff did not need to prove that the defendant 
either intended to cause the specific injuries that occurred or to 
cause any injury at all.76 
Still other opinions contain language in one part of the opinion 
that appears to endorse one position, along with language in another 
part of the opinion that appears to endorse the opposite position.  
For example, in Villa v. Derouen,77 the defendant intentionally pointed 
a welding cutting torch in the plaintiff co-worker’s direction and 
intentionally released oxygen or acetylene gas, unintentionally 
causing second degree burns to Villa’s groin.78  At one point in the 
                                                          
 69. 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978). 
 70. Id. at 715. 
 71. Id. at 718 (“[A]n intent to do harm is not essential to the action.”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. 254 N.Y.S.2d 633 (App. Div. 1964). 
 74. Id. at 634. 
 75. Id. at 635. 
 76. Id.  Just a few years prior to the decision in Masters, another New York court 
appeared to adopt the dual intent rule when it held that a six-year-old boy who 
pushed a four-year-old girl was liable for a battery, stating, “[d]efendant’s intent to 
inflict upon plaintiff an offensive bodily contact, known to him to be offensive, has been 
established by the fair weight of the credible evidence.”  Baldinger v. Banks, 201 
N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (emphasis added). 
 77. 614 So. 2d 714 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 78. Id. at 715. 
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opinion, the Louisiana appellate court stated that “[t]o constitute a 
battery, [the defendant] need only intend that the oxygen he sprayed 
toward the plaintiff come into contact with [plaintiff], or have the 
knowledge that this contact was substantially certain to occur,”79 
which sounds like single intent.  Later in the opinion, however, the 
court stated that “the harmful or offensive contact and not the 
resulting injury is the physical result which must be intended,”80  
which sounds more like dual intent.  Similarly, in Brenneman v. 
Famous Dave’s of America, Inc.,81 the district court for the Southern 
District of Iowa analyzed the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment by examining whether the defendant intended an act 
resulting in bodily contact that a reasonable person would deem 
insulting or offensive,82 which sounds like single intent, but at 
another point said that “intent is established if the actor knows that 
the consequences (i.e. offensive contact) are certain, or substantially 
certain, to result from his act,”83 which sounds like dual intent. 
The confusion evidenced by the loose language sometimes used by 
courts is compounded by the common use of terminology that differs 
from the Second Restatement’s formulation of “inten[t] to cause a 
harmful or offensive contact.”84  For example, in the 1891 opinion in 
Vosburg v. Putney,85 a casebook favorite, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin described the necessary element of intent as the intent to 
commit “an unlawful act,”86 and indeed, this type of language was 
common in the nineteenth century.87  In 1934, the Restatement 
(First) of Torts88 (First Restatement) rejected this language in favor of 
what appears to have been an entirely new formulation that the act 
be done “with the intention of bringing about a harmful or offensive 
contact or an apprehension thereof.”89  Since the First Restatement 
was published, Vosburg has been commonly interpreted as illustrating 
the intent to commit an offensive contact.90 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 717. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 410 F. Supp. 2d 828 (S.D. Iowa 2006), aff’d, 507 F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 82. Id. at 846–47. 
 83. Id. at 846. 
 84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13(a), 18(1)(a) (1965). 
 85. 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891). 
 86. Id. at 403. 
 87. See infra Part II. 
 88. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS (1934). 
 89. Id. § 13(a). 
 90. See, e.g., MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW:  THE ESSENTIALS 121 (2008) 
(concluding that the Second Restatement maintains that the defendant in Vosburg 
intended an offensive contact); James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Vosburg Comes First, 
1992 WIS. L. REV. 853, 859 (“Whatever substantive test the court adopted [in Vosburg], 
that test eventually developed into what today would be referred to as one defining 
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Nevertheless, some subsequent decisions persist in requiring the 
intent to commit an “unlawful” or “wrongful” act.  For example, in 
1958, more than twenty years after the First Restatement was 
published, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that students 
engaged in throwing erasers at each other in a classroom were liable 
for battery when an eraser hit the plaintiff, who had not been 
participating in the activity.91  There, the court stated:  “[T]he willful 
and deliberate throwing of wooden blackboard erasers at other 
persons in a class room containing 35 to 40 students is [not] an 
innocent and lawful pastime, even though done in sport and without 
intent to injure.  Such conduct is wrongful . . . .”92  The court 
concluded that “the intention with which the injury was done is 
immaterial so far as the maintenance of the action is concerned, 
provided the act of causing the injury was wrongful, for if the act was 
wrongful, the intent must necessarily have been wrongful.”93  This 
language is almost identical to that used in Vosburg, which was one of 
several decisions cited in the opinion.94  As recently as 2007, a 
California court explained that ordinarily the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant intended to harm or offend the plaintiff, but then 
articulated an exception for cases where the defendant’s act was 
“unlawful.”95  In that case, the court stated that the defendant only 
needs to intend to do the unlawful act in question.96 
                                                          
‘offensive contact.’”); see also DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 60 (arguing 
that the facts of Vosburg are consistent with liability based on intent to make offensive 
bodily contact).  But see ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 23 (interpreting Vosburg as 
requiring only intent to make contact that is inappropriate under the circumstances, 
regardless of whether the defendant lacked the intent to harm or offend).  Abraham 
appears to endorse the single intent rule when he interprets Vosburg to require only 
that the defendant intend a touching, not that the defendant intend the touching to 
be harmful or offensive.  ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 23.  When distinguishing battery 
and negligence, however, he appears to endorse the dual intent rule, contending 
that “when one does not desire harm or offense to occur, his conduct is merely risky 
until he knows that harm or offense is substantially certain to result from it.”  Id. at 
24. 
 91. Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397, 398–99 (Okla. 1958).  It did not matter that 
the defendant there did not direct his activity toward the plaintiff.  Id. at 399.  Under 
the doctrine of transferred intent, a defendant who has a wrongful intent toward one 
person but who unexpectedly affects another will be treated as if he or she intended 
to affect the interests of the actual victim.  See supra note 46 (discussing the doctrine 
of transferred intent). 
 92. Keel, 331 P.2d at 399. 
 93. Id. (quoting 4 AM. JUR. 128, Assault and Battery § 5 (1963)). 
 94. Id. at 400. 
 95. Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 464 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
 96. Id.; see also Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire Dep’t, Inc., 407 N.E.2d 466, 472 
(N.Y. 1980) (describing battery as a lawsuit for “a deliberate and intentional wrongful 
act” and requiring that plaintiffs prove only a “deliberate intent or conscious choice 
to do the act which results in the injury”). 
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Yet another formulation of the intent requirement that departs 
from the text of sections 13 and 18 of the Second Restatement 
defines intent as “an intent to bring about a result which will invade 
the interests of another in a way that the law forbids.”97  Still other 
courts state that the plaintiff need only allege and prove that the 
defendant intended to do the act that resulted in the plaintiff’s 
injury.98 
In some cases, courts have brought into the definition of a battery 
the requirement that the plaintiff prove the absence of consent, 
sometimes substituting lack of consent for the intent to commit a 
harmful or offensive contact.99  In University of Idaho, for example, the 
Supreme Court of Idaho adopted the single intent rule in its 
rejection of any required intent to harm or offend, but also defined 
                                                          
 97. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 36 
(5th ed. 1984); see also Lawson, supra note 8, at 365 (labeling this as “[p]erhaps the 
least satisfying definition on intent”).  For opinions adopting this or similar 
language, see, for example, Wallace v. Rosen, 765 N.E.2d 192, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2002); Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 391 (La. 1987); and Andrews v. Peters, 330 
S.E.2d 638, 641 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), aff’d, 347 S.E.2d 409 (N.C. 1986).  This 
language departs from that used in the definitional sections of both the First and 
Second Restatements, but is similar to language used in the scope note to the First 
Restatement, which states that, although the writ of trespass had been extended to 
harms which were not intentional, this particular topic of the Restatement “deals 
only with bodily harms which are caused directly or indirectly by acts which were 
intended to invade some interest of personality of the other or of a third person.”  
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS ch. 2, scope note at 27 (1934).  That language does 
not appear to have been intended as a formulation of the intent necessary with 
respect to any particular intentional tort, since both Restatements provide that 
formulation in their definitional sections.  Thus, for battery, the Restatements 
provide that the necessary intent is to make a “harmful or offensive [bodily] contact.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13(a), 18(1)(a) (1965); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
TORTS §§ 13, 18(1) (1934).  Of course, to the extent that such language is intended 
to provide a formulation of the necessary intent in battery, it is circular and not at all 
useful.  See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 8, at 365.  In addition, this language is not 
helpful in discerning whether the Restatement adopts the single or dual intent rule. 
 98. See, e.g., Rajspic v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Idaho 
1986) (approving a jury instruction that for battery “the intent referred to is the 
intent to do the act complained of”); see also Maines, 407 N.E.2d at 472 (observing 
that New York battery cases require only a “deliberate intent or conscious choice to 
do the act which results in the injury”).  It is unclear whether the courts that use this 
formulation understand it in the literal way that Professor Lawson appears to think 
they do when he concludes that the “mere intent to act” is a formulation that would 
“capture a breathtaking range of cases that include inadvertent injury, whether 
purely accidental or negligent.”  Lawson, supra note 8, at 362.  In Rajspic, for 
example, the jury instruction in question went on to state that if the jury found that 
the defendant shot the plaintiff “intentionally, rather than accidentally, she should 
not be relieved from liability because she was insane at the time of the shooting and 
incapable of malice or specific intent to do injury.”  Rajspic, 718 P.2d at 1171.  If the 
defendant intentionally shot the plaintiff, then at the very least she intended bodily 
contact, which would satisfy the single intent rule. 
 99. See, e.g., Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978); White v. 
Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108 (Idaho 1990). 
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battery as the “intent to cause an unpermitted contact.”100  The Mink 
court similarly defined battery as “the unauthorized touching of the 
person of another.”101  Adding to the confusion, Mink, unlike 
University of Idaho, apparently required that the defendant know that 
the contact was unpermitted, thereby incorporating a form of the 
dual intent rule.102  Elsewhere in the opinion, however, the Mink 
court had appeared to reject the dual intent rule, stating that the 
requisite element of intent is met when the plaintiff shows “an intent 
to bring about the contact.”103  Such cases do not necessarily 
articulate a single definition of battery; rather, they sometimes appear 
to adopt slightly different formulations in different parts of the 
opinion. 
C. Consent Under the Second Restatement and its Implications for the Single 
 and Dual Intent Rules 
The persistent emphasis in many cases on the plaintiff’s lack of 
consent is puzzling given the absence of any mention of consent in 
the Second Restatement’s definition of battery in the text of sections 
13 and 18.104  In addition, the comment to section 13 provides a cross-
reference to privileges preventing liability, including consent, stating 
that these privileges will be defined in later sections.105  This 
comment suggests that consent, like self-defense, is an affirmative 
defense and not an aspect of the prima facie case.  However, the 
comment contains the following very important clarification: 
The absence of such consent is inherent in the very idea of those 
invasions of interests of personality which, at common law, were the 
subject of an action of trespass for battery, assault, or false 
imprisonment.  Therefore the absence of consent is a matter 
essential to the cause of action, and it is uniformly held that it must 
be proved by the plaintiff as a necessary part of his case.106 
                                                          
 100. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d at 109. 
 101. Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 717. 
 102. Id.  Requiring that the defendant know that a contact is unpermitted is the 
equivalent of requiring knowledge that the contact will be offensive, which is what 
the dual intent rule requires.  See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 103. Id. at 718. 
 104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965). 
 105. Id. § 13 cmt. d. 
 106. Id.  The comment to section 18 does not contain any comparable 
explanation.  See id. § 18.  Comment f on the effect of “mistake” cross-references 
sections 892–892D on consent, but does not address the question of whether the 
absence of consent is part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case or an affirmative defense.  
Id. § 18 cmt. f. 
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Almost identical language appeared in comment f to section 13 in 
the First Restatement.107  The text of the First Restatement, however, 
defined harmful battery as requiring not only “the intention of 
bringing about a harmful or offensive contact,”108 but also a lack of 
consent or other privilege.109  Although the text itself did not clarify 
whether the absence of consent (unlike the non-consensual 
privileges) is itself an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the 
First Restatement’s inclusion of the absence of consent in the very 
definition of battery made it more likely that readers would look to 
the comment, rather than the text, to determine whether the absence 
of consent is part of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.110 
Unfortunately, discovering the pertinent language of both the First 
and Second Restatements concerning the absence of consent does 
not do much to clarify the evident confusion in existing court 
opinions, casebooks, and many commentaries.  The pertinent 
language does suggest both that it is the plaintiff’s burden to prove 
absence of consent and that the absence of consent is intended as an 
additional requirement—not as a substitute for the intent to cause a 
harmful or offensive contact.111  What it does not indicate, however, is 
whether or how there can be an intent to offend when the defendant 
honestly believes that the plaintiff has consented (or would consent) 
to the intended contact.  When the defendant’s belief is reasonable, 
then the plaintiff may be found to have given apparent consent, and 
the defendant will not be liable regardless of intent.112  But what if the 
defendant’s belief that the plaintiff has consented is unreasonable?  
May the plaintiff then prevail because of the lack of apparent 
consent, or will the court require—with respect to the separate 
element of intent—that that the defendant must have at least known 
                                                          
 107. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. f (1934) (“[A]bsence of consent is 
inherent in the very idea of those invasions of interest of personality which at 
common law were the subject of an action of trespass for assault, battery or false 
imprisonment.  Therefore, the absence of consent is a matter necessary to constitute 
an actionable assault, battery or false imprisonment . . . .”). 
 108. Id. § 13(a). 
 109. Id. § 13(b)–(c). 
 110. The comment does not say so explicitly, but that is clearly implied in the 
language of the comment.  See id. 
 111. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. d (1965); RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. f (1934). 
 112. According to section 892(2) of the Second Restatement, it is only when the 
defendant reasonably believes that the plaintiff has consented that apparent consent 
is established.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) (1979) (“If words or 
conduct are reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they 
constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in fact.” (emphasis 
added)); see also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 892 (1939) (describing consent as 
actual or apparent assent). 
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that the contact was unpermitted,113 as the Mink court suggested?114  
Are these questions relevant to the initial question of whether the 
Second Restatement adopts either dual or single intent?  And what 
about jurisdictions that have apparently rejected the Restatement 
definitions in favor of a formulation in which battery is defined as the 
intent to cause an unpermitted contact?115  Is it necessary in these 
jurisdictions to prove that the defendant intended to cause a contact 
that the defendant knew was unpermitted (a version of dual intent) 
or is it sufficient that the defendant intended a contact that turns out 
to be unpermitted (a version of single intent)? 
In summary, existing court opinions are even more confused than 
is suggested by the debate over whether the Second Restatement 
adopts dual versus single intent.  Part II provides a brief account of 
the historical development of the tort of battery, which will be helpful 
in understanding why so many modern courts do not adhere to the 
Second Restatement formulation of the definition of a battery and 
what they might mean when they use a different formulation.  Such 
an historical account may also be helpful in determining the proper 
interpretation of the relevant Second Restatement provisions and in 
formulating a clearer approach for a Third Restatement. 
II. A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
 TORT OF BATTERY 
A. Origins of the Tort of Battery 
The action in battery originated in the early common law writ of 
trespass, which included not only battery, but also assault, false 
imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels.116  In its 
earliest form, trespass had a quasi-criminal character, aiming at 
“serious and forcible breaches of the King’s peace.”117  Indeed, it was 
in connection with criminal proceedings that damages were assessed 
as an incidental matter in favor of the injured victim.118 
                                                          
 113. “Intent” is defined in the Second Restatement to denote either “that the 
actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the 
consequences are substantially certain to result from it.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 8A (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 1 (2010). 
 114. See Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713, 717 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (explaining 
that a defendant must have “intended to cause an unpermitted contact” in order to 
be liable for battery). 
 115. See supra notes 69–76 and accompanying text. 
 116. KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 6, at 29–30. 
 117. Id. at 29. 
 118. Id. 
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Although conceived originally as covering force and violence,119 at 
some point early on it became clear that the writ of trespass covered 
many of what we would now view as offensive bodily contacts, such as 
“spitting upon a person; pushing another against him; throwing a 
squib or any missile or water upon him.”120  The justification was that 
minimal levels of force and violence might prompt a breach of the 
King’s peace and that the law could not ignore such behavior.121  It 
was said that “[t]he least touching of another in anger is a battery”122 
and that “[t]he law cannot draw the line between different degrees of 
violence, and therefore totally prohibits the first and lowest stage of 
it.”123  In other words, early courts and commentators did not 
distinguish between “harmful” and “offensive” batteries. 
The writ of trespass was initially the remedy for all forcible, direct 
injuries to either person or property and did not necessarily require 
any form of fault.124  Subsequently, the writ of trespass on the case was 
developed, in order to provide a remedy for “obviously wrongful” 
conduct causing injuries that were either “not forcible or not 
direct.”125  From the beginning, the case writ required some form of 
fault.126  Ultimately, that writ came to be used for all cases alleging 
mere negligence, whereas trespass remained the appropriate remedy 
for intentional wrongs.127 
This shift to the current division between intentional torts and 
negligence was gradual.128  By the mid-nineteenth century, there was 
growing recognition that there should be no liability for pure 
accident,129 but this recognition did not lead to any clear distinction 
between an action in battery and an action in negligence.  Rather, it 
was commonly said that with respect to an action in battery (no 
separate tort of negligence then being recognized), “the plaintiff 
                                                          
 119. DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 28, at 54. 
 120. 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 191 (1859) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 121. See 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 84, at 71 
(Edward Avery Harriman ed., 16th ed. 1899) (“The degree of violence is not 
regarded in the law . . . .”). 
 122. HILLIARD, supra note 120, at 191 (quoting Cole v. Turner, (1704) 87 Eng. 
Rep. 907 (K.B.) 907; 6 Mod. 149, 149). 
 123. Id. at 192 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120). 
 124. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 6, at 29 (recounting that this conduct was 
most likely to provoke retaliation).  The threshold for “forcible” was low; “so long as 
the defendant applied some physical force to the victim or his property, trespass was 
in principle available.”  GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 15, app. at B-7. 
 125. KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 6, at 29. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. § 6, at 30 (arguing that the split into separate actions for intentional 
torts and negligence was unintentional). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. § 67, at 31. 
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must come prepared with evidence to show, either that the intention 
was unlawful, or that the defendant was in fault; for if the injury was 
unavoidable and the conduct of the defendant was free from blame, 
he will not be liable.”130  Thus, in describing the various acts for which 
a defendant might be liable, treatise writer Greenleaf stated that if a 
defendant “[d]rives a horse too spirited, or pulls the wrong rein, or 
uses a defective harness, and the horse taking fright injures 
another,—he is liable for battery.”131  On the other hand, “if the 
injury happened by unavoidable accident, in the course of an 
amicable wrestling-match, or other lawful athletic sport, if it be not 
dangerous, it may be justified.”132 
In other words, there was at this time such a thing as a “negligent 
battery.”133  For example, in an 1829 case, the twelve-year-old 
defendant shot an arrow from a bow, striking the plaintiff and 
putting out one of his eyes.134  The plaintiff had been hiding from the 
defendant, who shot at a nearby basket.135  When the plaintiff 
unexpectedly raised his head, the arrow struck him.136  The court 
upheld a trespass judgment for the plaintiff, instructing the jury that 
shooting an arrow in a school room where there were a number of 
boys assembled was “at the least, grossly negligent and 
unjustifiable.”137  Similarly, in an 1822 decision, the New York 
Supreme Court found a defendant liable for trespass when he went 
up in a balloon and inadvertently came down in the plaintiff’s 
garden.138  The court held that it was foreseeable that a crowd would 
be drawn into the garden, thereby damaging the plaintiffs’ vegetables 
                                                          
 130. GREENLEAF, supra note 121, § 85, at 72; see also 1 EDWIN A. JAGGARD, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 150, at 435 (1895) (delineating that battery requires 
both exerted force and either “[f]ault or intention on the part of the wrongdoer”); 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 6, at 31 (noting the growing recognition that “the 
defendant must be found to be at fault, in the sense of being chargeable with a 
wrongful intent, or with negligence”).  Greenleaf’s treatise has a section on assault 
and battery and no separate section on negligence; rather, negligence is discussed in 
a subsection within the assault and battery chapter.  GREENLEAF, supra note 121, § 85, 
at 72–73; see also HILLIARD, supra note 120, at 187, 191 (including no separate chapter 
on negligence, but including a chapter on assault and battery that discusses batteries 
in which the bodily contact is negligent, but not intentional).  An earlier version of 
Greenleaf’s treatise was cited by the court in Vosburg, the 1891 casebook favorite 
opinion relying on intent to commit an “unlawful act.”  See Vosburg v. Putney, 50 
N.W. 403, 403 (Wis. 1891). 
 131. GREENLEAF, supra note 121, § 85, at 72 (footnote omitted). 
 132. Id. at 72–73. 
 133. 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 3.3, at 313 
(3d ed. 2006). 
 134. Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391, 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 392. 
 138. Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381, 383 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822). 
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and crops.139  It is notable that in these cases, and in other similar 
cases,140 the courts failed to find not only that the defendant intended 
to injure the plaintiff, but also that the defendant intended to make 
or cause any contact with the plaintiff’s person or property.  
B. Historical Defenses to the Tort of Battery 
Because battery included both intentional and unintentional (but 
direct) bodily contacts, the defense of contributory negligence was 
available not only in case, but also in trespass for battery, regardless of 
whether the defendant’s conduct was willful or merely negligent.  In 
an 1854 decision, for example, the defendant was found to have 
committed a trespass when he assaulted, beat, and pushed the 
plaintiff into a running railroad car.141  In its opinion, the Supreme 
Court of Indiana held that the plaintiff was not required to flee to 
avoid injury, but that “if [the plaintiff] use[d] ordinary care to 
prevent injury, and injury ensue[d] from the wrongful act of the 
defendant, the plaintiff will be entitled to recover,” thereby indicating 
that contributory negligence would have precluded recovery.142  
Similarly, in an 1877 decision, the Supreme Court of Indiana found 
that the fourteen-year-old defendant had committed a clear assault 
and battery when he picked up a piece of mortar and threw it at one 
boy, hitting another and causing serious injury, there being “no 
question of contributory negligence, ‘or of mutual consent to engage 
in play of a dangerous character.’”143 
In insisting that the action in trespass required some degree of 
fault on the part of the defendant, courts often said that the plaintiff 
must show “either that the intention was unlawful, or that the 
defendant was in fault.”144  Fault, in this sense, clearly referred to 
conduct that would now be described as negligent.145  With respect to 
                                                          
 139. Id. at 383. 
 140. For example, in a 1846 case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
carelessly and negligently drove his horse, causing his sleigh to collide with plaintiff’s 
horse and killing it.  Claflin v. Wilcox, 18 Vt. 605, 605 (1846).  The Supreme Court of 
Vermont held that the plaintiff had the option of bringing the action in either 
trespass or case.  Id. at 609–10; see also Honeycutt v. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., 180 
So. 91, 92 (Ala. 1938) (“It is settled in this jurisdiction that to maintain a civil action 
for an assault and battery, it is not essential that the infliction of the injury upon the 
plaintiff should be intended.  And it can often be sustained by proof of a negligent 
act resulting in unintentional injury.”(citation omitted)). 
 141. Heady v. Wood, 6 Ind. 82, 82 (1854). 
 142. Id. at 83. 
 143. Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130, 131–33 (1877) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (discussing how neither the injured boy nor the intended target threw 
anything at the defendant). 
 144. GREENLEAF, supra note 121, § 84, at 72. 
 145. Cf. KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 6, at 31 (“This transition was accompanied 
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an unlawful intention, courts appeared to be placing the emphasis on 
the unlawful nature of the act rather than on the intent of the actor.  
Thus, all that must have been intended is the act causing the harm, 
certainly not the harm, and at least initially, not even the bodily 
contact that caused the harm.146  A defendant’s conduct was unlawful 
if he did “an illegal or mischievous act, which [was] likely to prove 
injurious to others,” and even in the absence of such unlawful 
conduct, the defendant would be liable if “he [did] a legal act in such 
a careless and improper manner that injury to third persons may 
probably ensue.”147  In other words, although the modern conception 
of battery focuses on the intention of the actor, older law focused 
more on the relation of the act to the injury and the character of the 
act itself.148 
C. The Shift to the Current Distinction Between Negligence and Battery  
At some point courts began to distinguish between an action in 
negligence and an action in battery.  Assault and battery came to be 
viewed as requiring something more than mere negligence on the 
part of the defendant, that is, a bad intent or willfulness.149  Even 
then, however, courts struggled to determine what a bad intent might 
be.  In an 1889 case before the Supreme Court of Indiana, for 
example, the defendant rode a bicycle into the plaintiff, who was 
standing on a broad public sidewalk.150  The court noted that the 
defendant was clearly negligent, but that the plaintiff had sued for 
assault and battery, not negligence.151  In determining whether the 
plaintiff had successfully proved a battery, the court stated that it was 
“not essential that there should be a direct or specific intention to 
commit an assault and battery at the time violence is done a 
plaintiff.”152  Rather, “[t]he facts may be such as to create an implied 
or constructive intention to do a wrongful act, although there is no 
direct or specific unlawful intention.”153  With regard to the facts of 
                                                          
by a growing recognition that, regardless of the form of the action, there should be 
no liability for pure accident, and that the defendant must be found to be at fault, in 
the sense of being chargeable with a wrongful intent, or with negligence.”). 
 146. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
 147. HILLIARD, supra note 120, at 94 (quoting Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio 464, 
465 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847)). 
 148. HARPER ET AL., supra note 133, § 3.3, at 316–17. 
 149. See, e.g., Mercer v. Cobin, 20 N.E. 132, 132 (Ind. 1889) (“There must be 
something more than a mere negligent touching of a plaintiff’s person in order to 
constitute an assault and battery.”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
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that case, the court held that the facts stated in the jury’s verdict 
“justif[ied] the finding . . . that the act of the [defendant] was a rude 
and reckless one,” thereby “justify[ing] the legal conclusion that 
there was such a reckless disregard of consequences as to imply an 
intention to assault the [plaintiff].”154  Similarly, in a 1902 decision, 
the Appellate Court of Indiana also invoked the concept of a 
“constructive intent which makes a wrongful act willful.”155  There, 
the court rejected the defendant’s claim that he had no intent to 
injure the plaintiff because there was “such a reckless disregard of 
consequences on the part of the [defendant] as to imply an intention 
to assault plaintiff.”156 
The concept of unlawful or wrongful conduct was also invoked in 
cases in which the defendant may have intended to benefit the 
plaintiff, but the court nevertheless found a battery because the 
bodily contact was against the will of the plaintiff.  This was usually 
the case when surgeons operated without the consent of the patient 
in non-emergency situations.  For example, in a 1905 decision, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota stated, “[i]f the operation was 
performed without plaintiff’s consent, and the circumstances were 
not such as to justify its performance without, it was wrongful; and, if 
it was wrongful, it was unlawful.”157  Citing a treatise to the effect that 
“any unlawful or unauthorized touching of the person of another, 
except it be in the spirit of pleasantry, constitutes an assault and 
battery,” the court concluded that the surgery was a “violent [act], 
not a mere pleasantry.”158  Similarly, in an 1878 decision involving a 
defendant who intervened in a scuffle between the intoxicated 
plaintiff and another person, inadvertently breaking the plaintiff’s 
leg, the Supreme Court of New York held that the defendant need 
not have acted in anger and that he could be liable even if his act was 
done in good nature and from good motives, so long as it was against 
the will of the plaintiff.159  Further, in a 1920 case involving a sexual 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 133. 
 155. Reynolds v. Pierson, 64 N.E. 484, 485 (Ind. App. 1902). 
 156. Id.  Professor Deana Sacks discussed the concept of “constructive intent” in 
her recent article on sexual batteries.  See Deana Pollard Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 
77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1078 (2008).  Professor Sacks apparently assumes that 
battery requires intent to harm or offend, but then advocates an approach whereby a 
defendant who “exceeds the bounds of ordinary social usages and violates social 
norms . . . will be held to have done so with constructive intent to offend.”  Id. 
 157. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905); see also Rolater v. Strain, 137 
P. 96, 98 (Okla. 1913) (“[T]he removal of the sesamoid bone by the surgeon was 
without the consent of the patient, and was therefore unlawful and wrongful, and 
constituted a trespass upon her person.”). 
 158. Mohr, 104 N.W. at 16. 
 159. Johnson v. McConnel, 22 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 293, 294 (1878). 
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touching of a young woman by the woman’s employer, the Supreme 
Court of Washington held that it was not necessary to demonstrate 
that the assault was made in an angry or insolent manner, but that 
“[a]n indecent assault [on a woman] consists in the act of . . . taking 
indecent liberties . . . without her consent and against her will.”160 
D. The First Restatement’s Approach to Battery 
This was more or less the state of affairs when the First Restatement 
was adopted in 1934.  In its definitional sections on battery, the First 
Restatement distinguished between harmful and offensive contacts.161  
It also limited the action in battery to contacts that were intended 
(thereby relegating merely negligent or even reckless contacts to the 
action in negligence)162  and with respect to the required intent, 
apparently originated the phrase “intention of bringing about a 
harmful or offensive contact”163 as a substitute for the prior emphasis 
by courts and commentators on “unlawful,” “wrongful,” or 
“constructive” intent.164  The First Restatement recognized that 
absence of consent was an essential aspect of battery;165 it did not, 
however, clearly indicate whether the defendant must have intended 
harm or offense,166 nor did it explain the relationship between 
absence of consent and intent to cause a harmful or offensive 
contact.167 
III. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT 
A. Ambiguity of Intent Provisions 
In Muniz, the first decision to squarely address the question of 
whether the Second Restatement clearly required dual intent, the 
Supreme Court of Colorado found that the Second Restatement 
clearly required dual intent, and that this requirement was in accord 
                                                          
 160. Martin v. Jansen, 193 P. 674, 674–75 (Wash. 1920), aff’d en banc per curiam, 
198 P. 393 (Wash. 1921). 
 161. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13 (1934) (harmful contacts); id. § 18 
(offensive contacts). 
 162. Id. at ch. 2, scope note at 27. 
 163. Id. §§ 13(a), 18(a).  I have not been able to locate any cases or commentary 
using the phrase “intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact” prior to its 
usage in the First Restatement. 
 164. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. 
 165. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 13(b) (1934) (requiring that “the contact is 
not consented to by the other”). 
 166. See id. § 13 cmt. e (referring to “the intention described in this Section,” but 
not defining what that intention entails). 
 167. See id. § 13 cmt. f (discussing consent as “a matter necessary to constitute an 
actionable . . . battery” but not in reference to intent). 
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with the general view of courts and commentators, including Prosser 
and Keeton’s treatise.168  In Wagner, the next case to squarely address 
the same question, the Supreme Court of Utah found, to the 
contrary, that the Second Restatement clearly requires only single 
intent and that this requirement was in accord with the general view 
of courts and commentators, including the same Prosser and Keeton 
treatise.169  How is it that these two courts held such diametrically 
opposed views of both the Second Restatement provisions and the 
Prosser and Keeton treatise?  As some recent commentators have 
correctly observed, the Second Restatement provisions are 
ambiguous, particularly with respect to various statements in the 
comments, including references to the types of cases for which 
defendants will be held to have the requisite intent.170  The same 
ambiguity can be found in the Prosser and Keeton treatise.171 
In its finding that the Second Restatement endorses the dual intent 
rule, the Muniz court relied primarily on the plain language of the 
text, i.e., the requirement that a defendant must have acted 
“intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact.”172  Although the 
court did not explain its reasoning, it  may have believed that the 
most natural reading of this phrase was that there must be intent to 
harm or offend, as well as to cause bodily contact, and conversely, 
that it would be unnatural to interpret this phrase to mean that the 
actor must intend to cause a contact that turns out to be harmful or 
offensive.173  Similarly, the Prosser and Keeton treatise states that 
                                                          
 168. White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 816 (Colo. 2000). 
 169. Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599, 605 (Utah 2005). 
 170. See supra notes 5–20 and accompanying text. 
 171. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 8, at 33–34. 
 172. Muniz, 999 P.2d at 816 (emphasizing this language in a block quote of 
section 18); see, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE GLANNON GUIDE TO TORTS 22–23 (2009) 
(“[U]nder the Restatement approach it is not enough for the defendant to intend 
contact.  The defendant must intend to cause a harmful or offensive contact . . . . 
[S]ome jurisdictions reject the Restatement’s intent standard for battery in favor of 
proof of an intent to cause contact.”); EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL 170–
71 (5th ed. 2010) (acknowledging the split between dual and single intent, but citing 
section 13 of the Second Restatement as support for dual intent requirement); 
Lawson, supra note 8, at 356–57 (“In the tort of battery, the actor must intend a 
harmful or offensive contact with another.  Consequently, the actor’s intent must 
have two objects:  contact with another, and a harm or offense resulting from that 
contact.” (footnote omitted)). 
 173. See Muniz, 999 P.2d at 817–18 (reviewing case law and commentaries 
supporting single intent but settling on dual intent as “the Restatement’s definition 
on intent”).  In addition to citing to the text of section 18, the Colorado Supreme 
Court cited to the following language in comment e: 
[I]t is necessary that an act be done for the purpose of bringing about a 
harmful or offensive contact . . . to another or to a third person or with 
knowledge that such a result will, to a substantial certainty, be produced by 
his act.  It is not enough to make an act intentional that the actor realize that 
it involves any degree of probability of a harmful or offensive contact . . . less 
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“‘[i]ntent’ is the word commonly used to describe the purpose to 
bring about stated physical consequences,” that intent also includes 
“those consequences . . . which the actor believes are substantially 
certain to follow from what the actor does,” and that battery requires 
a “harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act 
intended to cause the plaintiff or a third person to suffer such a 
contact, or apprehension that such a contact is imminent.”174  The 
Muniz court likely viewed the most natural reading of the phrase 
“such a contact” as referencing the earlier phrase “harmful or 
offensive contact.” 
In finding that the Second Restatement endorses the single intent 
rule, the Wagner court began with a discussion of Section 8A, which 
defines the term “intent” to “denote that the actor desires to cause 
the consequences of his act or that he believes that the consequences 
are substantially certain to result from it.”175  In its discussion, the 
court described an example involving shooting a gun in comment a 
to section 8A.176  The example was designed to clarify that the actor 
must intend not only the act of pulling the trigger, but also the 
consequence of hitting a person, thereby distinguishing between an 
accidental and an intentional shooting.177  The court then concluded 
that “[b]attery liability, rather than liability sounding in negligence, 
will attach only when the actor pulled the trigger in order to shoot 
                                                          
than a substantial certainty that it will so result. 
Id. at 816 n.6 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. e (1965)).  Once 
again, the only way that this language supports the dual intent rule is through the 
assumption that the most natural reading of the phrases “purpose of bringing about 
a harmful or offensive contact” and “such a result” is that there must either be a 
purpose to harm or offend (as well as to contact) or knowledge that “such a result” 
will follow.  Id. at 815, 819. 
 174. KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, §§ 8–9, at 35, 39 (second and third emphases 
added).  While the Muniz court cited only section 8 of the Keeton treatise and not 
section 9, see Muniz, 999 P.2d at 816, it is section 9 that addresses the intent required 
in battery.  Section 8 contains only a general discussion of the meaning of “intent.”  
In addition to citing the Prosser and Keeton treatise, the court cited section 30 of 
Professor Dobbs’s 2000 treatise.  Id.  That citation is curious because in the cited 
section, Dobbs clearly states that the Second Restatement formulation is ambiguous.  
DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 58 (“The question is whether the plaintiff 
shows intent by showing merely an intent to touch that turned out to be offensive or 
harmful, or whether she must show that the harm or offense was also intended.  On 
this point the Restatement and some of the cases are ambiguous.”).  Elsewhere in his 
treatise, Dobbs is himself ambiguous as to whether single or dual intent is required.  
Compare id. § 28, at 53 (“An intent to cause actual harm is a sufficient intent but not a 
necessary one.  It is enough that the defendant intends bodily contact that is 
‘offensive’ . . . .” (footnotes omitted)), with id. § 29, at 57 (“[I]n the case of battery, 
the plaintiff’s burden is to show that the defendant intended to and did cause either 
harm or ‘offense’ . . . .”). 
 175. Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599, 604 (Utah 2005) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)). 
 176. Id. at 604–05 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (1965)). 
 177. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (1965)). 
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another person, or knowing that it was substantially likely that pulling 
the trigger would lead to that result.”178  As for the question of 
whether the shooter must intend that the bodily contact would cause 
harm or offense, the Wagner court looked first “to the plain language 
of the law itself.”179  However, rather than looking to the text of 
section 13, on which the Muniz court relied,180 the Wagner court 
looked to “the plain language of the comments,”181 citing comment c 
to section 13, which states that “it is immaterial that the actor is not 
inspired by any personal hostility to the other, or a desire to injure 
him” and that “[t]he actor will be liable for battery even if he 
honestly but ‘erroneously believed[d] that . . . the other has, in fact, 
consented to [the contact].’”182  The court then described two 
examples used in the comment to illustrate actionable battery:  “an 
actor playing a good-natured practical joke, under the mistaken 
belief that he has his victim’s consent to make the contact” and “the 
healing contact of a physician, acting with helpful intent but against 
                                                          
 178. Id. at 604.  Of course, it would also be sufficient if the defendant intended to 
cause the imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive bodily contact.  See supra 
note 45 and accompanying text. 
 179. Id. at 605. 
 180. White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 816 (Colo. 2000).  Earlier in the opinion, the 
Wagner court concluded: 
[T]he plain language of the Restatement, the comments to the Restatement, 
Prosser and Keeton’s exhaustive explanation of the meaning of intent as 
described in the Restatement, and the majority of case law on the subject in 
all jurisdictions including Utah, compels us to agree with the State that only 
intent to make contact is necessary. 
Wagner, 122 P.3d. at 603.  However, the court never explained how the textual 
language itself supports the single intent rule. 
 181. See Wagner, 122 P.3d at 605 (“The plain language of the comments makes 
clear that the only intent required to commit a battery is the intent to make a 
contact, not an intent to harm, injure, or offend through that contact.”); see also 
King, supra note 3, at 632 (“The key [textual] language, ‘intending to cause a 
harmful or offensive contact’ (or its apprehension) does not tell us whether a 
defendant must have merely intended a contact (or its apprehension) that turns out 
to be harmful or offensive, or must have also intended that its effect be harmful or 
offensive.”). 
 182. Wagner, 122 P.3d at 605 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A cmt. a (1965) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Several commentators also cite this language to support the single intent 
rule, although they concede that the language is not definitive on that point.  See, 
e.g., King, supra note 3, at 633; Reynolds, supra note 8, at 729–30; Simons, supra note 
6, at 1067.  The Wagner court also cited section 283B of the Second Restatement and 
its comment c, which addresses the liability of the mentally ill actor for conduct that 
does not conform to the reasonable person standard, as support for the single intent 
rule.  Wagner, 122 P.3d at 608 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. c. 
(1965)).  However, this section of the Restatement addresses the liability of the 
mentally ill for negligence, not for intentional torts such as battery.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965).  In battery, mere departure from the reasonable 
person standard is clearly insufficient to establish liability; no one disagrees that the 
Second Restatement requires that a battery defendant must, at the very least, intend 
bodily contact (or the apprehension of an imminent bodily contact). 
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the patient’s wishes.”183 
As for the Prosser and Keeton treatise, the Wagner court referenced 
that treatise’s “echo[ing]” of comment c to section 13 when it quoted 
the treatise to the effect that “[t]he intent with which tort liability is 
concerned is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do harm” 
but “an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests 
of another in a way that the law forbids.”184  Conceding that this latter 
statement is itself ambiguous, the court concluded that  “all 
ambiguity on the point is eviscerated by Prosser’s next comment, in 
which he lists as one type of intentional tort the act of  ‘intentionally 
invading the rights of another under a mistaken belief of committing 
no wrong.’”185   
It should be clear by now that neither the text nor the comments to 
the Second Restatement provide definitive guidance with respect to 
dual or single intent.186  My own view is that the  Muniz court was 
correct to view the textual language as more naturally supporting the 
dual intent requirement,187 but the Wagner court was also correct to 
view the comments as at least appearing to favor the single intent 
rule.188  Nevertheless, it is not out of the question to read the text as 
                                                          
 183. Wagner, 122 P.3d at 605 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c. 
(1965)). 
 184. Id. at 606 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 8, at 36). 
 185. Id. (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 8, at 37). 
 186. See supra notes 5–20 and accompanying text. 
 187. To the contrary, Professors Henderson, Pearson, Kysar, and Siliciano believe 
that the text supports the single intent rule, arguing that the objectiveness of the 
definition of “offensive” in section 19 appears to eliminate the requirement that the 
defendant subjectively desire to offend the plaintiff, although they do concede that 
“one could argue that the objective definition of ‘offensive’ does not necessarily 
eliminate the ‘intent to offend’ requirement.”  HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 
34 (noting that under section 19 of the Restatement, a bodily contact is offensive if it 
is “offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 19 (1965))); see also Sacks, supra note 156, at 1077 n.127 (arguing that 
“[t]he element of intent to offend may turn on a community standard insofar as the 
defendant is bound by community standards about what is reasonable and in 
accordance with social norms”); cf. BEST & BARNES, supra note 18, at 30–31 (asking 
whether dual intent is consistent with the fact that determining whether a contact is 
offensive depends on an objective test).  But this argument apparently confuses intent 
to offend with the requirement that the resulting contact be offensive to a reasonable 
sense of personal dignity, which eliminates liability in the case of the unduly sensitive 
plaintiff.  The Second Restatement purports to take no position on the liability of a 
defendant who acts with the purpose to offend an unduly sensitive plaintiff, knowing 
of the undue sensitivity.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 caveat (1965).  
However, section 18, taken literally, does not permit such liability when the result is 
merely offensive contact because the result element of “offensive contact” is clearly 
defined objectively in section 19.  See id. § 18; see also id. § 19. 
 188. Comment e to section 18, however, appears to favor the dual intent rule, at 
least to the extent that the language repeats the language of the text in a way that 
makes the dual intent rule the more natural reading of such language.   
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. e (1965) (“In order that the actor may 
be liable under the rule stated in this Section, it is necessary that an act be done for 
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requiring an intent to make contact that turns out to be harmful or 
offensive, and it is also possible to explain how the comments, as well 
as the statements in the Prosser and Keeton treatise, are consistent 
with the dual intent rule.  For example, it should be obvious that, 
even under the dual intent rule, battery does not require either 
personal hostility or a desire to injure because liability is assigned if the 
defendant knows that either harm or offense is substantially certain to 
occur.189  Moreover, even the desire to harm can exist without 
hostility.  For example, a defendant who engages in a boxing match 
under the mistaken impression that the plaintiff consented has the 
requisite intent to harm when he punches the plaintiff in the jaw, 
desiring to knock him to the floor.  The defendant will be liable if he 
is mistaken as to his opponent’s consent, and his mistake is an 
unreasonable one.190  Indeed, this boxing match example can also 
explain the Prosser and Keeton treatise’s inclusion among the 
intentional tortfeasors a defendant who acts “intentionally invading 
the rights of another under a mistaken belief of committing no 
wrong,” 191 because a defendant such as the one I have described 
mistakenly believes that he has the plaintiff’s consent and therefore 
that he is acting appropriately. 
B. Implications for Intent Provisions of Restatement’s Approval of Results in 
Certain Cases 
1. Vosburg 
Even if the language of the Second Restatement text and 
comments is ambiguous, various commentators have found 
persuasive support for the single intent rule in the Second 
Restatement’s approval of the results in certain cases or types of cases.  
For example, facts similar to those in Vosburg appear in the comment 
to section 16, in the form of an illustration explaining the textual 
provision that “[i]f an act is done with the intention of inflicting 
upon another an offensive but not a harmful bodily contact . . . the 
actor is liable to the other for a battery although the act was not done 
                                                          
the purpose of bringing about a harmful or offensive contact or an apprehension of 
such a contact to another or to a third person or with knowledge that such a result 
will, to a substantial certainty, be produced by his act.  It is not enough to make the 
act intentional that the actor realize that it involves any degree of probability of a 
harmful or offensive contact . . . .”). 
 189. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) (1979) (providing that defendant 
is privileged to inflict intentional harm or offense with actual or apparent consent of 
plaintiff, including “words or conduct [that] are reasonably understood . . . to be 
intended as consent”). 
 191. KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 8, at 37. 
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with the intention of bringing about the resulting bodily harm.”192  As 
a result, casebook authors and others often explain Vosburg as an 
example of the intent to make an offensive contact,193 which could 
mean either that the defendant had an intent to offend or that the 
intended contact turned out to be offensive.194  Some commentators, 
however, have remarked that it is implausible that the defendant in 
Vosburg intended to offend the plaintiff,195 and have therefore 
concluded that the Second Restatement’s approval of the result in 
that case represents an endorsement of the single intent rule.196  This 
is not necessarily the case; the Second Restatement drafters may 
simply have misread Vosburg as requiring intent to cause either a 
harmful or offensive contact (as opposed to requiring the intent to 
commit an “unlawful” act) in an attempt to shoehorn the result in 
that case in line with the formulations of both the First and Second 
Restatements.197  The possibility that the Restatement drafters 
misread Vosburg may not matter because decisions as old as that case, 
including others that formulated the intent requirement as the intent 
to commit an “unlawful act”198—as well as those recognizing a battery 
when the defendant was merely negligent or reckless with respect to 
the bodily contact itself199—would not necessarily survive a court’s 
                                                          
 192. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16(1) cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965). 
 193. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 194. The illustration begins with the statement that “[i]ntending an offensive 
contact, A lightly kicks B on the shin.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. a, 
illus. 1 (1965).  That language suggests to me that it was to be assumed that A 
intended offense, but it is possible that what was meant was that the contact A 
intended, the light kick on the shin, was in fact offensive.  Indeed, the illustration 
goes on to state that the kick, “although offensive,” was unlikely to cause bodily 
harm; nevertheless, A is said to be liable for the bodily harm that occurred because 
of the diseased condition of the leg.  Id.  In this respect, I concede that the 
illustration, along with other language in the comments, is at least ambiguous. 
 195. See, e.g., GEISTFELD, supra note 90, at 121. 
 196. See id. at 120; see also, ABRAHAM, supra note 37, at 23 (“That the defendant [in 
Vosburg] intended the touching was sufficient, even though the defendant did not 
necessarily intend the touching to be harmful or offensive.”). 
 197. The reference to Vosburg appears in both the First and Second Restatements 
as an illustration to section 16.  See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. a, illus. 1 
(1934); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965).  In any 
event, what single intent proponents appear to ignore is that Vosburg clearly required 
something more than a mere intent to make a bodily contact that turned out to be 
harmful or offensive.  The historical evolution of the “unlawful intent” standard in 
cases like Vosburg indicates that what the court required was some degree of actual 
wrongdoing—either an unlawful intent or some fault.  See supra Part I.B (discussing 
Vosburg).  The defendant may well have been negligent in failing to understand that 
the plaintiff would find the contact to be offensive, but “unlawful intent” was 
supposed to reflect some wrongdoing that was greater than (or at least different 
from) mere negligence. 
 198. See Raefeldt v. Koenig, 140 N.W. 56, 57 (Wis. 1913) (citing Donner v. Graap, 
115 N.W. 125 (Wis. 1908), and Degenhardt v. Heller, 68 N.W. 411 (Wis. 1896), for 
the premise that “unlawful intent” is the very premise of assault and battery). 
 199. See supra notes 149–60 and accompanying text (describing situations in which 
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adoption of either the First or the Second Restatement.  As a result, 
the illustration to section 16 does not shed much light on the 
question of whether the Restatement provisions should be 
interpreted as adopting the dual or single intent rule.200 
2. Medical batteries 
Comment c to section 13 of the Second Restatement notes with 
approval that physicians are uniformly held liable for battery, even 
when they act with helpful intent but against the patient’s wishes.201  
Commentators often view cases involving medical batteries as 
problematic under the dual intent rule, particularly when a physician 
mistakenly believes that the patient has consented.  As a result, they 
view the Second Restatement’s approval of these cases as evidence of 
adoption of the single intent rule.  According to these commentators, 
when physicians act in accord with what they view as the best interests 
of the patient, under the sincere, but mistaken, belief that the patient 
has consented, the physician intends neither to harm nor to offend 
the patient.202  In my opinion, however, these cases can be explained, 
consistent with the dual intent rule, in either one of two ways. 
First, the vast majority of these cases involve operations, and as one 
court long ago observed, a medical operation is a “violent assault, not 
a mere pleasantry.”203  In fact, section 15 of the Second Restatement 
defines “bodily harm” as “any physical impairment of the condition of 
another’s body, or physical pain or illness,”204 and the comment 
elaborates that “[t]here is an impairment of the physical condition of 
another’s body if the structure or function of any part of the other’s 
body is altered to any extent even though the alteration causes no 
other harm.”205  The illustration to this comment describes an 
                                                          
bodily contact may implicate negligence). 
 200. Indeed, the illustration itself states that A kicked B on the shin “[i]ntending 
an offensive contact,” perhaps adding a fact that was either missing or obscured in 
the actual Vosburg opinion.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16 cmt. a, illus. 1 
(1965). 
 201. Id. § 13 cmt. c. 
 202. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 8, at 360; Reynolds, supra note 8, at 724 
(concluding that “[t]he medical situations again illustrate that only intent to contact 
is required” because these are among the situations in which the trier of fact may 
agree that the defendant intended no harm or offense but the defendants are 
nevertheless held liable); Simons, supra note 6, at 1067–68 (viewing these medical 
battery cases as “impossible to explain” under the dual intent view). 
 203. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905). 
 204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 (1965). 
 205. Id. § 15 cmt. a.  The Third Restatement similarly defines “bodily harm” as 
“the physical impairment of the human body” as well as “physical injury, illness, 
disease, impairment of bodily function, and death.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 4 (2010).  The comment, however, states 
that “any detrimental change in the physical condition of a person’s body or 
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operation in which the physician removes a wart on a patient’s neck.  
Although it is stated that “[t]he removal in no way affects [the 
patient’s] health, and is in fact beneficial,” the illustration concludes 
that the patient has suffered bodily harm.206  Thus, as another court 
recently concluded, operations clearly encompass the alteration of a 
structure or function of the body and are therefore necessarily 
harmful.207  As a result, in these cases it is unnecessary to find that the 
physician intended offense, as it can readily be concluded that the 
physician intended harm, as defined by the Restatement, although 
there was no intent to injure. 
Second, even when there is no intent to harm, as when the 
physician conducts an invasive physical examination—such as a 
gynecological examination—intent to offend may be found by 
separating the elements of intent and lack of consent.  Thus, 
physicians inevitably will know that, in the absence of consent 
(including emergencies, in which consent is typically presumed),208 a 
patient will find either surgery or an invasive physical examination to 
be offensive.209 
3. Other “helpful intent” cases 
It is important to keep in mind that even when the element of 
intent has been satisfied, a physician will not be liable for battery if 
                                                          
property counts as harmful impairment.”  Id. § 4 cmt. c.  The comment no longer 
includes the illustration of the beneficial wart removal, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 15 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965), but that example is cited with approval in the 
Reporters’ Note as a tortious invasion of the patient’s “right to bodily integrity,” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 4 
reporters’ note to cmt. c (2010).  See also HENDERSON, supra note 15, at 30 
(differentiating alterations in the body from physical harm or impairment). 
 206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965). 
 207. See Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 658 n.28 (Ky. 2000) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 cmt. a., illus. 1 (1965)). 
 208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D cmt. a (1965). 
 209. Professor Simons argues that physicians who honestly, but mistakenly, believe 
that they are acting with the patient’s consent do not have the intent to harm or 
offend.  See Simons, supra note 6, at 1069 (noting that physicians who honestly 
believe that a patient consents under the apparent consent doctrine cannot possibly 
believe that a patient plaintiff will be offended by the touching).  Professor Dobbs 
attempts to refute that argument by conflating the elements of intent and offense.  
He argues that in the absence of even apparent consent, the physician knows that the 
contact will be offensive.  DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 29, at 55–56.  But this 
argument does not really answer Professor Simons’s concern with respect to 
physicians who honestly believe the patient has consented, regardless of whether that 
mistake is reasonable or unreasonable.  In my view, the answer to Professor Simons 
clearly requires separating the elements of intent and lack of consent.  There is one 
example that remains hard to explain:  the permanently comatose patient who has 
previously made it clear that life-sustaining treatment is unwanted.  See Lawson, supra 
note 8, at 359 n.24.  However, this case is problematic under both the dual and the 
single intent rule because even under the single intent rule, it is not obvious how the 
resulting intended contact is either harmful or offensive. 
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the plaintiff consented or if there was at least apparent consent.210  
The point is that the physician’s motive to benefit the plaintiff is 
irrelevant; if the physician knows that the intended treatment will be 
harmful, in the minimal Restatement sense, or if the physician 
understands that, in the absence of consent, the treatment will be 
offensive, then the element of intent has been satisfied.  In these 
situations, the consent or lack of consent is a factor that can (and 
should) be considered separate and apart from the element of intent. 
The same explanation is also available in other “helpful intent”211 
cases that do not involve physicians.  For example, in a frequently 
cited case, the plaintiff alleged that the employees of a skating rink 
manipulated and pulled the plaintiff’s arm after she fell and 
fractured her arm, over the protestations of both the plaintiff and her 
husband.212  Analogizing the situation to one involving skilled 
medical personnel, the New Jersey court found that the employees’ 
behavior could have constituted a battery, defined as both “[t]he least 
manual touching of the body of another against his will” and as an act 
“unlawful in its own nature.”213  In doing so, the court did not discuss 
intent other than to say that “good intentions” are irrelevant to a 
finding of battery.214  Under the dual intent rule, the decision is easily 
explained because, despite the defendant’s good intentions, the 
defendant must have known either that the contact was harmful 
(given that it was clearly painful) or that, in the absence of consent, 
such manipulations would be offensive.  Similarly, a state appeals 
court in Illinois found a battery when two teachers lifted a minor 
student after she had been injured, pulling and shoving on her 
broken leg and hip, causing additional injuries.215  Here too, the 
defendants must have been aware that their actions were harmful and 
that, in the absence of consent, pulling and shoving on the girl’s leg 
                                                          
 210. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 211. Lawson, supra note 8, at 359. 
 212. Clayton v. New Dreamland Roller Skating Rink, Inc., 82 A.2d 458, 460 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951). 
 213. Id. at 462. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Bernesak v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 409 N.E.2d 287, 288–89 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1980).  The court’s opinion was somewhat confusing in finding that the amended 
complaint, which alleged a “willful” battery, did not plead either “a ‘malicious’ or an 
‘intentional’ tort.”  Id. at 291–92.  The original complaint alleged ordinary 
negligence, and the defendant had objected to the amended complaint as radically 
changing the plaintiff’s theory, which should have been alleged in a separate count 
on which separate forms of verdict could be submitted.  Id.  The court upheld a 
judgment for the plaintiff, rejecting the defendant’s argument.  Id. at 291–92 
(holding that because the amended complaint characterized the battery as willful 
and not malicious or intentional, there was not a “radical change” in the cause of 
action).  It is unclear how the court concluded that a claim of battery did not allege 
an intentional tort. 
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and hip would clearly be offensive.216  In both cases, the defendant’s 
liability for battery depended on the separate question of whether the 
plaintiff had given actual or apparent consent or whether the 
defendants were otherwise authorized to act as they did. 
4. Practical jokes and one-sided horseplay 
Yet another class of cases sometimes thought to be difficult to 
explain under a dual intent rule involves practical jokes and one-
sided rough horseplay.217  As some single intent proponents concede, 
many of these cases can conform to the dual intent rule because, 
given the circumstances, the defendant must have understood that 
the contact would be offensive, at least initially.218  Indeed, it is 
                                                          
 216. See id. at 289 (observing that the girl was shrieking in pain).  For an example 
of an older, similar case, see Johnson v. McConnel, 22 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 293 (1878), in 
which the defendant intervened in an altercation between the intoxicated plaintiff 
and a third person.  In the course of an ensuing scuffle between the defendant and 
the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s leg was broken.  Id. at 294.  The plaintiff clearly resisted 
the defendant’s efforts, and the contact was not a gentle one, suggesting that the 
defendant understood that the contact was both harmful (painful) and offensive 
(unwanted).  Id.  However, in Hoffman v. Eppers, 41 Wis. 251 (1876), the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin held that a defendant who aroused the plaintiff from his 
drunken stupor and, in a “gentle and friendly manner,” assisted him to the court 
where he was required to testify as a witness did not commit a battery.  Regardless of 
the defendant’s intent in that case, the result can be explained under the Second 
Restatement as a failure to satisfy the result element of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case; the contact resulted in no harm and the court apparently believed that it would 
not have offended a reasonable sense of personal dignity, given the particular 
circumstances.  Id. at 258. 
 217. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 8, at 358 (stating that practical jokers clearly 
intend an end other than harming or offending, yet are still routinely held liable 
despite not satisfying the dual intent rule); Reynolds, supra note 8, at 718–21; 
Simons, supra note, 6, at 1068 (labeling practical jokers as a “counterexample” to the 
dual intent rule because they are routinely held liable despite not satisfying the dual 
intent rule). 
 218. For example, Professor Simons concedes that in cases like Garratt v. Dailey, 
the defendant’s very purpose may have been to hurt (albeit only slightly) or offend 
the elderly woman who was about to sit down in the chair he pulled it away from her.  
Simons, supra note 6, at 1068 n.23.  Professor Simons similarly concedes that “many 
other practical-joker cases involve desire to offend or at least knowledge that offense 
is very likely to result, and thus could be explained by the dual intent approach.”  Id. 
at 1068 n.25.  Rather, Professor Simons, who is clearly a proponent of the single 
intent rule, relies primarily on the language of some of the practical joker opinions, 
as well as language in the comments to the Second Restatement, which state that 
neither “personal hostility” nor “desire to offend” is necessary for liability.  Id. 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 34 (1965)).  This reliance is misplaced.  
It is irrelevant under the dual intent rule that the defendant acts without “personal 
hostility.”  As for the absence of a “desire to offend,” the Restatement drafters were 
surely aware that “intent” is broadly defined to include either desire or knowledge 
with “substantial certainty” that the relevant consequences will result.  See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).  Practical jokers typically desire 
offense, at least initially; physicians and other helpers usually do not typically desire 
either harm or offense, but they will inevitably know that those results will occur when 
they perform operations or other invasive treatments or examinations without the 
consent of the plaintiff. 
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difficult to imagine a case—except perhaps for one involving a young 
child or a mentally deficient adult—in which the dual intent rule 
would not be satisfied.219  Certainly for practical jokes, the very 
purpose of the joke is to cause at least some initial offense, although 
the defendant may be hopeful that the victim of the joke will 
subsequently come to see humor in the situation.220 
A number of these cases involve fairly extreme circumstances, such 
as the defendant who “suddenly and without warning” jumped onto 
the plaintiff’s back screaming “boo,” pulled the plaintiff’s hat over his 
eyes, and rode him piggyback, accidentally causing the plaintiff to fall 
and strike his face on meat hooks hanging nearby.221  The parties 
agreed that the accident occurred as a result of “one-sided horseplay 
with no intention on [the defendant’s] part to injure plaintiff.”222  In 
an opinion strongly suggesting the single intent rule, the Second 
Circuit held that the complaint stated a battery.223  Nevertheless, 
although the defendant intended no harm, it is inconceivable that he 
did not understand that the plaintiff would, at least initially, be 
offended by having someone suddenly jump on his back and ride 
him piggyback while he was at work.  Other practical joker decisions 
can be similarly explained,224 including those involving children.225  
                                                          
Professor Reynolds also concedes that in many practical joker cases, particularly 
those involving adults, the defendant at least knew with substantial certainty that the 
plaintiff would be harmed or offended.  See Reynolds, supra note 8, at 719–20.  He 
notes, however, that many of the joker cases involve children, and he questions 
whether they were capable of realizing that harm or offense was substantially certain 
to occur.  Id. at 720.  In the cases Professor Reynolds cites, however, the defendant’s 
very purpose was probably to cause at least offense, as was the case in Garratt and 
Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 447 A.2d 84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982), in which a thirteen-year-
old student pulled a chair out from underneath her teacher.  
 219. If the plaintiff has previously given some indication of consent to this type of 
conduct, the defendant may rely on the apparent consent doctrine and will not be 
liable.  If, however, the plaintiff has not previously given some indication of consent, 
then the defendant will be liable under either the single or dual intent rule. 
 220. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. c (1965) (noting that the 
intent element is satisfied “although the actor erroneously believes that the other will 
regard it as a joke” because “[o]ne who plays dangerous practical jokes on others 
takes the risk that his victims may not appreciate the humor of his conduct and may 
not take it in good part”). 
 221. Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 442 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 222. Id. at 443. 
 223. Id. at 443, 445. 
 224. For example, in Cole v. Hibberd, No. CA94-01-015, 1994 WL 424103 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Aug. 15, 1994), the defendant, who had been drinking, playfully kicked the 
plaintiff, a friend, in the lower back.  When the plaintiff complained that the kick 
hurt, the defendant and her husband began laughing.  Id. at *1.  The Ohio appeals 
court found, as did the court in Lambertson, that the defendant’s conduct constituted 
a battery despite the absence of any intent to harm, stating that reasonable minds 
could conclude only that the defendant intended to kick the plaintiff.  Id. at *2.  
Although strongly suggestive of the single intent rule, the decision is just as well 
explained under the dual intent rule, since the defendant must have desired or 
known that the plaintiff would be offended by the kick.  See also Fuerschbach v. Sw. 
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Of course, it is possible that, if given instructions emphasizing that 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant either desired or knew 
with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would be harmed or 
offended, a jury might return a verdict in favor of a defendant, 
particularly when the defendant is a young child or a mentally 
deficient adult.226  Whether this is an undesirable result, however, is 
an open question and one to which I will return in the next 
section.227 
A more difficult situation involving practical jokes and rough 
horseplay concerns the defendant who mistakenly believes that the 
plaintiff has consented to this type of contact.  Thus, some 
commentators believe that the dual intent rule poses problems for 
cases of mistaken identity; for example, a defendant who intends a 
joke on a friend with whom the defendant has a mutual pattern of 
engaging in such pranks, but who mistakes a stranger for his friend.228  
It might be concluded that there is no intent to offend in such a case; 
                                                          
Airlines Co., 439 F.3d 1197, 1200 (10th Cir. 2006) (involving a mock arrest arranged 
by the plaintiff’s co-workers, in which police officers handcuffed the plaintiff in the 
airport in which she worked before informing her that it was a joke); Villa v. 
Derouen, 614 So. 2d 714, 715 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (examining a situation in which 
the defendant pointed a welding torch in the plaintiff’s direction, intentionally 
releasing gas into the plaintiff’s groin area); Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire Dep’t 
Inc., 407 N.E.2d 466, 469 (N.Y. 1980) (discussing a hazing incident in which 
volunteer firemen pulled a bed sheet over the plaintiff’s head, tied a leather belt to 
his waist, bound his feet with rope, held his arms to restrain him, carried him outside 
to a parking lot, and threw him in a garbage dumpster); Moore v. El Paso Chamber 
of Commerce, 220 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (concerning a young man 
who playfully chased the plaintiff, a young woman, for the purpose of roping her and 
imprisoning her while she was fleeing to avoid him). 
 225. For example, in Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 447 A.2d 84, 85 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1982), a thirteen-year-old student pulled a chair from under her teacher as a “joke.”  
Like the defendant in Garrett, the defendant in Ghassemieh must have desired, or at 
least known with substantial certainty, that the teacher would be offended when she 
unexpectedly hit the floor, otherwise the “joke” would not be funny.  Professor 
Reynolds concedes that the minor defendant was “perhaps capable of realizing that 
harm or offense was substantially certain to result to the plaintiff.”  Reynolds, supra 
note 8, at 720 (emphasis added); see also Markley v. Whitman, 54 N.W. 763, 763 
(Mich. 1893) (involving high school students playing a game of “rush,” in which the 
students formed a line and each pushed the student ahead until the last student hit 
an unsuspecting victim; here, the hit to the victim was so hard that it fractured his 
neck). 
 226. See infra Part IV (highlighting the benefits and criticisms of both the single 
and dual intent rules). 
 227. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the policy implications of finding for the 
defendant in practical joke cases and cases where the defendant is a child or adult 
with developmental problems). 
 228. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 8, at 723 n.27 (discussing the theory that 
contacts that cause harm require only single intent and those that cause offense 
require dual intent can explain the results of mistaken identity cases but ultimately 
rejecting the theory as not supported by the cases cited as support (citing Charles E. 
Carpenter, Intentional Invasion of Interest of Personality, 13 OR. L. REV. 227, 235 
(1934))). 
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however, it is unclear whether either courts or the Second 
Restatement drafters would find a battery in such a situation, as there 
are but few cases involving mistaken identity, and the situation is 
typically presented as an acknowledged hypothetical.229  Moreover, it 
is unclear whether courts should find a battery in cases involving 
mistaken identity, at least when the mistake is reasonable.230  
However, assuming that there should be liability, at least for mistakes 
that are unreasonable, there is a way to reach that result without 
insisting on the single intent rule.  This involves use of the 
methodology previously used to explain the medical and other 
“helpful intent” battery cases:  separating the elements of intent and 
absence of consent.231  Thus, we would first ask whether this 
defendant knew that, in the absence of consent, this is the type of 
contact that would be offensive.232 The answer will typically be yes 
given the nature of the contacts envisioned for these cases.233  We 
would then invoke the apparent consent rule, which under the 
Second Restatement must be considered with respect to the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case and not as an affirmative defense.234  If the 
defendant was unreasonable in believing that the plaintiff had 
consented, then the prima facie case is satisfied, and the defendant 
will be liable, just as she would be under the single intent rule.235  As 
for reasonable mistakes, regardless of whether courts adopt single or 
dual intent, the defendant can presumably invoke the doctrine of 
apparent consent.236 Because the ultimate outcome depends not on 
                                                          
 229. See id. at 723 (describing mistaken identity cases as “seldom actually 
encountered”).  The only battery case I have found involving mistaken identity is a 
medical battery case in which a physician performed a spinal test on the wrong 
patient who had been mistakenly called in from the waiting room by a nurse who did 
not even inquire as to the patient’s identity.  See Gill v. Selling, 267 P. 812, 813, aff’d 
en banc, 270 P. 411 (Or. 1928).  For a discussion of the possibility that courts are 
applying specialized rules for cases involving battery in the context of medical care, 
see infra Part V. 
 230. See infra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing the dual intent rule in 
sexual touching cases). 
 231. See supra notes 213–16 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 206–09 and accompanying text. 
 234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. f (1965); id. § 892 (defining 
apparent consent); supra notes 112–23 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
Second Restatement implies that the plaintiff should bear the burden of proving lack 
of consent). 
 235. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B cmt. c (1979) (stating that the 
defendant’s mistake in believing that the plaintiff consents to the contact is only 
effective as apparent consent if the defendant is reasonable in that belief). 
 236. Commentators posing the mistaken identity hypothetical apparently assume 
that the defendant in that case is and should be liable, even if the mistake is 
reasonable.  See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 8, at 723–24 (citing examples of 
hypotheticals that would result in liability).  They do not explain why, but it may be 
because the Second Restatement provides in section 892A that the actual or 
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the element of intent, but rather on the defendant’s ability to invoke 
the doctrine of apparent consent, the result in such cases should be 
the same under either the single or the dual intent rule.237 
5. Sexual touchings 
The methodology I am suggesting for analyzing cases involving 
mistaken identity in practical jokes can also be used to explain the 
results in sexual touching cases where the defendant unreasonably 
believes that the plaintiff will welcome the contact or when the 
plaintiff expressly consents, but the consent is legally invalid, as in 
cases involving statutory rape.  These cases are often understood to 
be difficult to explain under the dual intent rule.238  Once again, 
however, we can usually conclude that a competent adult defendant 
understands, as most people do, that sexual touchings will offend a 
person who has not indicated in some manner that such a contact 
would be welcome;239 we would then ask separately whether or not 
                                                          
apparent consent must be given “by one who has the capacity to consent or by a 
person empowered to consent for him.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
892A(2)(a) (1979).  I have found no cases squarely addressing this question and, for 
reasons set forth in Part V, I conclude that mistaken identity defendants should not 
be liable when they act reasonably under the circumstances. 
 237. If the result is different in a case involving a reasonable mistake, it would be 
because the doctrine of apparent consent is limited to defendants who rely on 
conduct of the plaintiff and not someone else.  See supra notes 211, 218 and 
accompanying text.  In my view, holding a defendant liable for battery in such a 
situation is problematic, given the defendant’s lack of any apparent fault.  See infra 
notes 245–47 and accompanying text.  In any event, hypotheticals involving cases of 
mistaken identity may not assist in determining whether the Second Restatement 
adopts either dual or single intent. 
 238. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 8, at 379–80 (arguing in favor of a formulation in 
which the intent required is to make an unauthorized bodily contact); see also JOSEPH 
W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS 15–16 (4th ed. 2010) (stating that, in the absence of 
a single intent rule, a defendant may be held liable only if “the law will attribute to 
him an understanding of what the reasonable person finds offensive”).  Even 
Professor Dobbs, a proponent of the dual intent rule, finds problematic cases 
involving sexual boors and thereby finds it necessary to modify the dual intent rule in 
such cases.  DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 28, at 53 (providing that a caress may 
be battery unless the circumstances would indicate that it is acceptable). 
 239. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Famous Dave’s of Am., Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 828, 846–
47 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (stating that a reasonable person would consider slapping a 
woman on the buttocks offensive), aff’d, 507 F.3d 1139 (8th Cir. 2007); Paul v. 
Holbrook, 696 So. 2d 1311, 1311 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (involving a defendant 
who gave an unwelcome shoulder massage to his co-worker); Wirig v. Kinney Shoe 
Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 376–77 (Minn. 1990); Liljegren v. United Rys. Co. of St. 
Louis, 227 S.W. 925, 926 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921) (finding that an intoxicated train 
passenger who kissed another passenger on the cheek had committed a battery).  But 
see J.W. v. Utah, No. 2:05CV00968K, 2006 WL 1049112, at *5 (D. Utah 2006) 
(following the single intent rule previously adopted in Wagner and finding a battery 
despite the fact that the seven-year old mentally handicapped defendant was 
incapable of understanding the injurious or offensive nature of a violent sexual 
assault of the plaintiff), aff’d, 647 F.3d 1006 (10th Cir. 2011).  Whether mentally 
deficient children or adults should be found capable of committing a battery is a 
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the circumstances were such that the defendant reasonably believed 
that the plaintiff consented to the contact.240  In cases involving 
sincere, but unreasonable, mistakes as to consent, the plaintiff will 
still prevail, and the only question remaining is whether the rare 
defendant who sincerely, but unreasonably, believes that this type of 
contact is not generally offensive should escape liability for lack of 
intent to offend—a question to which I will return in the next 
section.241  As for cases involving statutory rape, most defendants will 
acknowledge that, in the absence of consent, the sexual intercourse is 
a bodily contact that will be highly  offensive.  Having thereby found 
the dual intent requirement easily satisfied, at least in most cases,242 
we would then analyze consent as an element separate and apart 
from intent.243 
C. Necessity of Separating Intent and Absence of Consent 
The suggested methodology to determine whether a defendant 
intends a contact to be offensive is also useful in clarifying the 
confusion that exists in the current case law and commentary 
concerning the relationship between the intent to make a harmful or 
offensive contact and the absence of consent on the part of the 
plaintiff.  For example, Professor Simons argues that the apparent 
consent doctrine would be superfluous if the Restatement had 
adopted the dual intent rule,244 but in my view he is mistaken.  The 
doctrine is certainly not superfluous in cases where the defendant 
clearly has the intent to harm (as in a surgical operation as well as a 
boxing match) and the apparent consent doctrine is necessary for the 
defendant to avoid liability in situations where the defendant 
mistakenly, but reasonably, believes that the plaintiff has 
consented.245  It is also not superfluous in cases involving intended 
contacts that are merely offensive, at least when the defendant 
understands that, in the absence of consent, such contact would be 
offensive.  In these cases, the doctrine of apparent consent would also 
                                                          
matter of policy as to which courts and commentators disagree.  See infra notes 334–
41 and accompanying text. 
 240. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt. c (1979). 
 241. See infra notes 330–34 and accompanying text (discussing the “intuitive 
fairness” rule in the context of sexual boors). 
 242. The exception will be in cases involving mentally deficient children and 
adults.  See infra notes 266, 349–57 and accompanying text. 
 243. See supra Part I.A. 
 244. See Simons, supra note 6, at 1069 (arguing that if a defendant honestly 
believes that the plaintiff consented, the defendant cannot intend to offend and 
therefore can never be liable under the dual intent rule). 
 245. See supra text accompanying note 209 (illustrating how a defendant may 
intend to harm even though he reasonably believes the plaintiff has consented). 
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exonerate defendants who make reasonable mistakes but not those 
whose mistakes are unreasonable.246 
Professor Simons acknowledges the possibility of using what he 
calls “conditional intent,” but he argues that treating such consent 
“the same as an actual intent to offend is artificial and unjustifiable” 
and “pretty much dissolves the distinction between single and dual 
intent.”247  With respect to the “artificial” aspect of conditional 
consent, I assume that he is referring to the fact that the defendant 
may not, in fact, desire or know with substantial certainty that this 
particular plaintiff, in these particular circumstances, will be offended,248 
given the defendant’s belief that the plaintiff has consented to the 
contact.249  It is not “artificial,” however, to determine whether the 
defendant knew that, in the absence of consent, this type of contact 
would be offensive to persons in the plaintiff’s position.250  Moreover, 
this determination does not undermine the notion of dual intent 
because it is entirely possible—for example in the case of the insane 
and small children, as well as in the case of competent adults from an 
entirely different culture, and possibly even in the case of “sexual 
boors”251—that the defendant in fact did not have such knowledge, 
and thus the test has not been satisfied.  As for any possible injustice, 
Professor Simons is correct when he concludes that a defendant who 
has “conditional intent” is less culpable than one who acts with actual 
intent,252 but the implications of this conclusion are far from clear.  
After all, a defendant who shoots in the sincere but unreasonable 
belief that the plaintiff is threatening to harm him is certainly less 
culpable than a defendant who shoots with no apparent justification, 
                                                          
 246. See infra notes 256–63 and accompanying text (emphasizing that only 
reasonable mistakes can be exonerated). 
 247. Simons, supra note 6, at 1069 n.26. 
 248. His argument appears to be limited to intended offensive contacts because 
the methodology he calls “conditional consent” is unnecessary in cases in which the 
defendant intends to benefit the plaintiff, but knows with substantial certainty that 
harmful contacts will occur.  Id. 
 249. I do not see any similar problem with respect to the intent to harm because 
such intent, as in the medical cases, is entirely independent of any belief as to the 
plaintiff’s consent.  See supra notes 205–09 and accompanying text (concluding that 
under the Restatement, physicians intend to harm when they perform operations).  
It is only with respect to the intent to offend that we should determine intent—in the 
sense of knowledge with substantial certainty—independent of any belief as to the 
plaintiff’s consent. 
 250. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (applying the methodology of 
separating the elements of intent and absence of consent). 
 251. A “sexual boor” is a defendant who claims to believe that his sexual advances 
are welcome, when they are not.  See GLANNON, supra note 238, at 15–16 (describing 
“Romeo, who is of the opinion that no woman in her right mind would object to his 
attentions” and who engages in behavior that a reasonable woman would find 
offensive). 
 252. Simons, supra note 6, at 1069 n.26. 
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and yet the sincere but mistaken defendant in that situation will 
nevertheless be liable for committing a battery.253  
Professor Simons also argues that it is unjustifiable to treat the 
defendant with “conditional intent” more harshly than another 
defendant who “honestly (though unreasonably) believes that he will 
not cause any contact at all.”254  Of course, if the defendant desires or 
knows that his conduct will cause even apprehension of an imminent 
harmful or offensive bodily contact, then he will have the requisite 
intent under the dual intent rule.255  Thus, the hypothetical Professor 
Simons uses does not work well to illustrate his point because the 
defendant who “playfully lunges at his friend, pretending to try to 
tackle him, while believing that there is little chance of contacting 
him, but . . . accidentally knock[ing] his friend to the ground,”256 will 
in fact satisfy the dual intent standard because such a defendant 
intends to cause “imminent apprehension” of a bodily contact, 
although not an actual contact.  As for the defendant who merely acts 
recklessly or negligently with respect to either contact or the 
apprehension of contact, I would argue that such a defendant is 
indeed less culpable than the defendant who intends bodily contact; 
in any event, the Second Restatement clearly distinguishes and treats 
differently those who intend bodily contact and those who are merely 
reckless or negligent with respect to such contact,257 and Professor 
Simons does not challenge this distinction.  Moreover, by treating the 
elements of intent and lack of consent in different sections,258 the 
Second Restatement appears to require that the absence of consent 
be considered separately from the requisite intent to make a harmful 
or offensive contact, although courts and commentators sometimes 
view them as different ways of saying the same thing. 
Failure to recognize intent as an element separate from the 
absence of consent poses its own problems.  For example, if “intent to 
                                                          
 253. Intent is satisfied under both single and dual intent because the defendant 
clearly intended to harm the plaintiff.  The privilege of self-defense is available only 
when the defendant reasonably believed that the plaintiff was threatening to harm 
him.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63, 65 (1965). 
 254. Simons, supra note 6, at 1069 n.26. 
 255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13(a), 18(1)(a) (1965) (stating that a 
person is liable for battery if he acts intending to cause apprehension of imminent 
contact). 
 256. Simons, supra note 6, at 1069 n.26. 
 257. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 cmt. g (1965) (clarifying that 
actions producing an offensive contact are actionable only as intentional torts and 
that an actor is not liable for acts that involve the mere risk of offensive contact). 
 258. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8A, 892–892D (1965) (addressing 
intent just before introducing torts and defining consent in the context of defenses).  
Underscoring this divide is the fact that the intent was included in volume 1 released 
in 1965, while consent was not defined until volume 4, published in 1979. 
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cause an unauthorized contact” is substituted for “intent to make a 
harmful or offensive [contact]” as some commentators have 
suggested,259 then it would still be necessary  to decide whether the 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew that the contact was 
unpermitted or whether it is sufficient that the contact turned out to 
be unpermitted.  This exercise is simply another version of the dual 
intent versus single intent debate.260 
In addition, formulating the rule in this way suggests that even 
unduly sensitive plaintiffs should recover whenever they have made 
their wishes known.261  Some commentators have generally approved 
this result,262 although the Second Restatement expressly declined to 
take a position on the question,263 and under the existing text of 
sections 18 and 19, the unduly sensitive plaintiff apparently would not 
recover (regardless of the defendant’s intent) because the resulting 
contact would not offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity, as 
those sections require.264  Even those commentators, however, agree 
                                                          
 259. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 8, at 368 (proclaiming this as the “ideal 
formulation of intent”); cf. DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 28, at 52–53 (“The 
defendant is subject to liability for a simple battery when he intentionally causes 
bodily contact to the plaintiff in a way not justified by the plaintiff’s apparent wishes 
or by a privilege, and the contact is in fact harmful or against the plaintiff’s will.” 
(footnotes omitted)).  There is at least one case in which a court reached that result.  
See Cohen v. Smith, 648 N.E.2d 329, 335–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (finding battery 
where a male nurse participated in a caesarian section despite the patient previously 
informing the hospital that her religion prohibited her from being touched or 
observed naked by a male). 
 260. Compare DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 28, at 52–53 (stating that a 
defendant is liable for battery when he intentionally causes contact in a manner “not 
justified by the plaintiff’s apparent wishes” (emphasis added)), with id. § 30, at 58 
(referencing “an intent to touch in a way the defendant understands is not consented 
to” (emphasis added)).  In fact, there are four possibilities:  (1) the defendant knows 
that the contact is unpermitted; (2) the defendant believes that the contact is 
permitted, but it is not, and the defendant’s mistake is unreasonable; (3) the 
defendant believes that the contact is permitted, but it is not, and the defendant’s 
mistake is reasonable; and (4) the defendant has no belief as to whether the contact 
is or is not permitted.  The last possibility should probably be considered to be the 
equivalent of the first, leaving three different possibilities for courts to consider in 
determining what type of consent is required to establish a battery.  A version of this 
debate has occurred in the context of medical batteries, with most courts and 
commentators opting for requiring knowledge that the contact was unpermitted.  See 
infra Part V.C.1. 
 261. If not, then the defendant may be entitled to presume that the plaintiff has 
or will consent to contacts that would not offend a reasonable sense of personal 
dignity. 
 262. See, e.g., DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 29, at 56 (“[I]f adequately 
expressed, the plaintiff’s wishes usually count for everything; she has a right to reject 
unprivileged touching that others would find reasonable.”). 
 263. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 caveat (1965) (acknowledging that the 
section would not cover unduly sensitive plaintiffs). 
 264. See GLANNON, supra note 238, at 15–16 (juxtaposing reasonableness and 
hypersensitivity, the latter of which does not impose a risk of liability).  The result 
may be different if the resulting contact turns out to be harmful, rather than 
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that there are some circumstances in which plaintiffs ought not be 
able to insulate themselves from unwanted touchings, as when a 
defendant lightly pushes a passenger aside, over the passenger’s 
manifest objection, in order to enter or exit a crowded subway.265  
The ability to eliminate liability in favor of such unduly sensitive 
plaintiffs requires either the clear separation of the elements of 
intent and the absence of consent (in which case the defendant does 
not have requisite intent because he understands that the unwanted 
touching would not offend a reasonable sense of personal dignity) or 
the express recognition of some privilege on the part of defendants 
to contact unduly sensitive plaintiffs, despite their manifest objection, 
under at least some circumstances, such as entering or exiting a 
crowded subway.266 
D. The Significance of Choosing Between Single and Dual Intent 
In many cases, it will not matter whether a court adopts the single 
intent or the dual intent rule.  Physicians will still be liable for battery 
in the absence of at least apparent consent, and practical jokers will 
still be liable in most cases when their rough play is such that it 
offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.267  There are, however, 
some recurring situations in which the choice between single and 
dual intent is likely to make a significant difference.  These situations 
include the “sexual boor” and those defendants, such as the insane or 
children, who may have the capacity to intend a bodily contact, but 
who either lack the capacity or are unlikely to appreciate that the 
intended contact will be either harmful or offensive.  It is in these 
cases that the law must squarely face the policy considerations 
involved in the choice between single and dual intent, as well as the 
proposed alternatives.  It is thus important for the Third Restatement 
                                                          
offensive, as when the plaintiff suffers from a pre-existing injury or disease.  Under 
the single intent rule, it would be sufficient that the intended contact turned out to 
be harmful, whereas under the dual intent rule, the defendant would be liable only if 
he intended to offend. 
 265. See, e.g., DOBBS, HORNBOOK supra note 9, § 29, at 56. 
 266. See, e.g., id. § 29, at 56–57 (“The real point seems to be, not that the plaintiff’s 
wishes are to be evaluated by others, but that others are as entitled as she to ride 
subways.”).  It is unclear what the result would be in such a case under the single 
intent rule if the contact involving the unduly sensitive plaintiff turns out to be 
harmful.  It would appear that the defendant will be liable unless courts explicitly 
recognize a privilege on the part of the defendant.  Cases like Cohen v. Smith, 648 
N.E.2d 329 (Ill. App. 1995), might be better explained by focusing on the fact that 
the hospital had agreed to honor the plaintiff’s request.  See supra notes 259–60 and 
accompanying text.  In the absence of such an agreement, perhaps the hospital 
should not have been liable for refusing to accommodate an unusually sensitive 
plaintiff. 
 267. See supra notes 203–30 and accompanying text. 
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to clarify which rule should be adopted. 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN CHOOSING BETWEEN SINGLE AND 
 DUAL INTENT 
A. Criticism of the Single Intent Rule 
Courts and commentators have criticized the single intent rule on 
several grounds, arguing that:  (1) it causes perverse results in 
situations involving workers compensation, insurance coverage, and 
governmental immunity for intentional wrongs;268 (2) it is overbroad 
because it would make defendants liable for non-offensive contacts 
that unexpectedly cause harm,269 as well as cases involving adulterated 
drugs and defective products;270 and (3) it violates the fault principle 
underlying most of modern tort law.271 
As for ancillary questions concerning workers compensation, 
insurance coverage, and governmental immunity—which typically 
                                                          
 268. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 6, at 1090 (noting that the “perverse effect” is 
only from the point of view of one who “believes in the fault hierarchy,” which 
distinguishes between intentional and the non-intentional torts); cf. WARD 
FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TEACHERS’ MANUAL TO TORTS:  CASES AND QUESTIONS 
12 (2004) [hereinafter FARNSWORTH & GRADY, TEACHERS’ MANUAL] (questioning 
whether the application of the single intent rule in White v. University of Idaho, to 
defeat liability under a statute granting the university immunity for intentional torts 
such as battery, was consistent with the likely point of that statute); Reynolds, supra 
note 8, at 726–30 (accusing several courts of apparently supporting the dual intent 
rule in order to avoid unduly harsh results under the shorter statute of limitations for 
battery, as opposed to negligence). 
 269. See DOBBS, PRACTITIONER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 94, at 91 (proposing a 
hypothetical in which “a wife hugs her husband with the unexpected result that, 
without fault, she causes a broken bone”); infra note 282 and accompanying text 
(discussing the problem with this hypothetical); see also Lawson, supra note 8, at 363 
(offering that “day-to-day life holds myriad intentional contacts made for benign 
purposes” that “occasionally go awry, inadvertently either harming or offending 
others”). 
 270. See, e.g., GEISTFELD, supra note 90, at 120–21; Lawson, supra note 8, at 363–65 
(outlining how the single intent rule would swallow up medical malpractice and 
products liability claims); see also infra notes 276–80 and accompanying text 
(observing that most of these cases would not be considered batteries because the 
consumer has consented to the contact). 
 271. See, e.g., White v. Muniz, 999 P.2d 814, 818 (Colo. 2000) (stating that dual 
intent does not erode the principle that “where one of two innocent persons must 
suffer a loss, it should be borne by the one who occasioned it” (quoting KEETON ET 
AL., supra note 97, § 135, at 1073)); DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 59; King, 
supra note 3, at 648.  Another criticism is that the single intent rule impairs the 
autonomy of potential defendants and the broader society to engage in activities.  See 
DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 29, at 56; King, supra note 3, at 649.  This criticism 
is not, in itself, very persuasive, since proponents of the single intent rule would likely 
respond that the rationale for single intent is to protect the autonomy of the 
plaintiff.  Some ground other than autonomy is needed to determine whose 
autonomy—potential plaintiffs or potential defendants—is more worthy of 
protection in the relevant cases.  See Reynolds, supra note 8, at 731; Simons, supra 
note 6, at 1099–100. 
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prevent plaintiffs from recovering on the basis of intentional torts—
there is good reason to object to a defendant’s ability to avoid liability 
for torts such as battery when the tortfeasor lacked any intent to harm 
or injure.272  However, rather than choosing between the single and 
dual intent rule on this basis, it would probably be better to separate 
questions of tort coverage from questions involving these ancillary 
issues.273  For example, workers compensation laws, insurance 
policies, and governmental immunity statutes might appropriately be 
interpreted to exclude only those cases involving an actual intent to 
injure, regardless of whether tort doctrine would consider the 
defendant’s conduct to be a battery or mere negligence.274  Similarly, 
with respect to statutes of limitations, there may be some situations in 
which the plaintiff should have the option to plead either negligence 
or an intentional tort.275 
Similarly, many of the criticisms regarding the overbreadth of the 
single intent rule are probably unwarranted.  For example, Professor 
Geistfeld suggests that, under the single intent rule, a drug 
manufacturer would be liable if a consumer suffered an 
unforeseeable adverse drug reaction, because the manufacturer 
intended bodily contact between the drug and the consumer and the 
contact was in fact harmful.276  Similarly, Professor Lawson believes 
                                                          
 272. See, e.g., Bublick, supra note 7, at 1348 (discussing the need to identify a “core 
of culpable entitlement-effacing intentional torts . . . for situations in which . . . 
intentional torts are treated in the same way as negligence”). The result was 
particularly perverse in Wagner v. Utah, 122 P.3d 599 (Utah 2005), where the 
defendant was not the same person as the tortfeasor.  In that case, the court found 
that the defendant-state government was not liable for negligently supervising a 
mental patient who physically attacked the plaintiff, on the ground that the patient 
had committed a battery and a state statute immunized the government from cases 
“arising out of” an intentional tort.  Id. at 601.  It is far from clear in Wagner that the 
policies underlying the state immunity statute applied in a case where the mental 
patient was incapable of formulating the intent to harm or offend and the state was 
allegedly negligent in failing to supervise him. 
 273. See, e.g., HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 69 (analyzing a decision 
involving insurance coverage by separating contractual issues from the battery 
issues); Simons, supra note 6, at 1096–97 (arguing for ancillary questions to be 
determined, at least in part, by the “policies and principles that operate in those 
domains” ancillary to tort law). 
 274. See, e.g., Rajspic v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 1167, 1170 (Idaho 
1986) (finding that an insurance policy exclusion for intentional torts was limited to 
cases involving an intent to injure, but that intent under the insurance policy was not 
the same as intent required for battery).  See generally Bruce Chapman, Allocating the 
Risk of Subjectivity:  Intention, Consent, and Insurance, 57 U. Toronto L.J. 315 (2007). 
 275. See Reynolds, supra note 8, at 729–30 (discussing the validity of treating some 
cases involving intentional conduct under the more flexible negligence principle 
and concluding that “the solution to problems raised by a short limitation period on 
battery, or by the rigidity of battery requirements, is not the redefining of ‘battery’ so 
as to exclude all cases except those in which harm or offense is intended” because 
“the concepts of negligence and battery are not mutually exclusive”). 
 276. GEISTFELD, supra note 90, at 120–21. 
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that cases involving adulterated drugs, defective products, medical 
malpractice, and even serving too-hot coffee could be treated as 
batteries under the single intent rule.277  But surely none of these 
cases are actionable batteries, even under the single intent rule, 
because the consumers will have been aware of and will have 
consented to the bodily contacts in question.278  Professor Lawson 
argues that such consent would be ineffective in cases where the 
consumer did not understand “the probable impact which the 
contact [would] have on the plaintiff’s protected interests,” i.e., that 
the drug would cause an adverse reaction or that it, or some other 
product, was adulterated or otherwise defective.279  Under current 
doctrine, however, consent will be ineffective only in situations where 
the defendant knew of the defect and failed to inform the plaintiff—
i.e., when the defendant fraudulently obtained the plaintiff’s 
consent.280  Admittedly, there will be some situations in which the 
defendant has at least statistical knowledge that some of its products 
will be defective and will cause harm to at least some consumers at 
some time in the future, but this type of statistical knowledge is 
probably insufficient to establish fraud in securing the plaintiff’s 
consent to contact with a product.281  Even if such statistical 
                                                          
 277. Lawson, supra note 8, at 362–65 (illustrating how the single intent rule could 
cause battery to replace much of negligence and strict liability laws). 
 278. Id. at 365.  Despite  acknowledging the existence of this consent, however, 
Professor Lawson claims that application of the single intent rule would result in 
“absolute liability” or “near-absolute liability” in all cases involving such defective 
products, “save perhaps when injury stems from risks about which the [consumer] 
was informed, and to which she consented.”  Id. at 364.  Professor Geistfeld does not 
acknowledge the likelihood that many of the cases will not result in liability as a 
result of the plaintiff’s actual consent to the contact in question.  See GEISTFELD, supra 
note 90, at 120–21. 
 279. Lawson, supra note 8, at 365 n.59 (citing a case in which the plaintiff’s 
consent to an eye operation was ineffective because he had not been informed that 
the “new lens was still under experimental investigation and had not been approved 
by [the] FDA”).  In the medical context, such informed consent is required when 
physicians are aware of a material risk, but fail to inform the plaintiff; under modern 
law, these cases are not considered to be batteries but rather are treated as a form of 
negligence on the part of the physician.  See infra Part V. 
 280. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2) (1979) (“If the person 
consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake 
concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be 
expected from it and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by the other’s 
misrepresentation, the consent is not effective for the unexpected invasion or harm.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 281. According to the Third Restatement, a defendant is liable for an intentional 
tort only when “the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty that the 
conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone within a small 
class of potential victims.”  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 1, cmt. e (2010); see also Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief and 
Recklessness:  Pruning the Restatement (Third)’s Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 
1179–80 (2001); Simons, supra note 6, at 1063 n.3.  See generally Kenneth W. Simons, 
Statistical Knowledge Deconstructed, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2012).  These sources do not 
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knowledge is sufficient to establish fraud, under these circumstances, 
defendants will be liable under both the single and the dual intent 
rule because they will know with substantial certainty that harm will 
occur in at least some cases. 
Professor Dobbs posits a different sort of hypothetical to illustrate 
the overbreadth of the single intent rule.  In his hypothetical, a “wife 
hugs her husband with the unexpected result that, without fault, she 
causes a broken bone.”282  He acknowledges that the apparent 
consent doctrine should ultimately exonerate the defendant wife, but 
he is disturbed that battery could impose even prima facie liability or 
that the defendant might be forced “into an over-elaborate and costly 
‘defense.’”283  Under the Second Restatement, as well as in the vast 
majority of jurisdictions, the absence of consent is part of the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case, a fact that should eliminate both of 
Professor Dobbs’s objections.284  In the few jurisdictions in which 
consent is a true affirmative defense, I share Professor Dobbs’s 
concern that the single intent rule would even impose prima facie 
liability, thereby placing the burden on the defendant to prove actual 
or apparent consent, but that will not be the usual case.285 
Professor Dobbs’s hypothetical does not accomplish his intended 
purpose because he acknowledges that the wife should ultimately 
prevail under the apparent consent doctrine.286  A better hypothetical 
                                                          
specifically address the question of the requisite knowledge with respect to a 
defendant’s fraud that renders a plaintiff’s consent ineffective; rather, they address 
the initial question of a defendant’s intent to cause particular consequences.  
Nevertheless, the same reasoning should apply in determining whether the 
defendant fraudulently obtained the plaintiff’s intent to a particular bodily contact.  
See Wadja v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 103 F. Supp. 2d 29, 36 (D. Mass. 2000) 
(refusing to allow a battery claim for a plaintiff suing a tobacco company for 
distributing cigarettes without revealing harmful tendencies because the claim was 
essentially one for fraud and did not bear indicia of an intentional tort claim). 
 282. DOBBS, PRACTITIONER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 94, at 91–92. 
 283. Id.; cf. Lawson, supra note 8, at 365 (arguing that even if the plaintiff’s 
consent relieves the defendant from liability, cases involving defective products 
should not be viewed “as batteries to which a plaintiff has consented”).  In response 
to both Professor Dobbs and Professor Lawson, I would argue there is a distinction 
between concluding that the plaintiff’s prima facie case has been met but that the 
defendant has a valid defense and the conclusion that the defendant’s conduct 
constituted a battery regardless of whether the defendant may claim an affirmative 
defense.  In my view, when the defendant prevails, the defendant has not committed 
a battery.  The more important question is whether it is fair to shift the burden of 
proving actual or apparent consent to the defendant when the defendant did not 
intend any harm or offense.  This appears to be Professor Dobbs’s primary objection 
to the single intent rule. 
 284. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. d (1965); supra note 24 
(describing the majority rule as requiring that the plaintiff must prove the absence of 
consent). 
 285. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 15, at 37 (stating that the conventional view 
places the burden of proving the absence of consent on the plaintiff).  
 286. See DOBBS, PRACTITIONER TREATISE, supra note 21, § 94, at 91–92 (pointing out 
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would be one in which there is neither intended offense nor 
apparent consent, and yet the result is an unexpectedly harmful 
contact.  Consider, for example, a variation of Vosburg.287  A young 
student lightly kicks a classmate after the class has been called to 
order.  He neither desires to offend or even to annoy the classmate, 
nor does he know with substantial certainty that this will be the result; 
rather, he acts simply to get the classmate’s attention.  Unknown to 
the student, however, the classmate has a pre-existing injury such that 
the light kick causes serious bodily injury.  Under the single intent 
rule, the defendant will presumably be liable because he intends a 
bodily contact that turns out to be harmful, and because the 
classmate has done nothing to indicate even apparent consent to 
being kicked, lightly or not, in a classroom that has been called to 
order.288  Under the dual intent rule, however, the defendant will not 
be liable because he neither desires nor knows with substantial 
certainty that the plaintiff would be either harmed or offended.289  
Here I share what I assume would be Professor Dobbs’s concern that 
the single intent rule would impose not only prima facie liability, but 
actual liability on the defendant without any moral fault on his part.290 
Indeed, the most persuasive argument against the single intent rule 
is that it is inconsistent with the “fault principle,”291—the principle of 
modern tort law that, except in unusual situations, which require 
justification, there will be “no legal liability for conduct that has no 
element of moral fault.”292  Recognized exceptions to this rule 
include strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities293 and strict 
liability for defective products,294 as well as the adoption of the 
objective reasonableness standard for evaluating both defendants’ 
and the plaintiffs’ conduct in negligence actions.295 
                                                          
that such contact is likely consented to in the marital context but that it would be 
“needlessly costly” for the wife to have to show her affirmative defense in court). 
 287. For a description of the actual case, see supra notes 192–200 and 
accompanying text. 
 288. Even if the question of apparent consent went to the jury, the jury could 
easily and justifiably find that there was no apparent consent and return a verdict for 
the plaintiff. 
 289. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 290. Id. 
 291. See DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 59 (explaining that the “wife’s 
hug” example is inconsistent with the fault principle because she did not intend to 
harm or offend); see also King, supra note 3, at 648. 
 292. HARPER ET AL., supra note 133, § 3.3, at 313.  
 293. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977). 
 294. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
 295. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (2010). 
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B. Defense of the Single Intent Rule 
Some defenders of the single intent rule have argued that the 
single intent rule is consistent with the fault principle, at least with 
respect to intended contacts that offend a reasonable sense of 
personal dignity.296  This is because, just as under the theory of 
negligence, the single intent rule holds the defendant to the standard 
of the reasonable member of the community, who is expected to 
know and abide by the community’s social norms.297  The “sexual 
boor,” for example, might be characterized as negligent and 
therefore at fault in failing to understand existing community 
standards.298  This argument, however, will not work in cases like my 
hypothetical version of Vosburg, in which the intended contact turns 
out to be unexpectedly harmful (rather than offensive), especially in 
situations where defendants cannot take advantage of the apparent 
consent doctrine to avoid liability.299 
More importantly, even if the defendant is to some extent at fault, 
at least with respect to offensive contacts, the potential liability of a 
defendant in battery is significantly greater than in it would be in 
negligence.300  For example, a  defendant who is negligent only with 
respect to the indignity that would result from an intended but 
unwanted touching is liable in battery for any resulting harm, no 
matter how unforeseeable.301  In negligence, however, the plaintiff 
                                                          
 296. See, e.g., HENDERSON, ET AL., supra note 15, at 30; Sacks, supra note 156, at 
1077–78. 
 297. See, e.g., DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 59; HENDERSON ET AL., supra 
note 15, at 30; Sacks, supra note 156, at 177–78.  These authors do not expressly 
adopt a negligence standard.  Indeed, Professor Dobbs describes the single intent 
rule as one of strict liability, although he also suggests that a defendant with no intent 
to offend might be found negligent if the contact results in actual harm.  DOBBS, 
HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 59.  The cases involving actual harm, however, tend 
to involve entirely unforeseeable physical harm, in which case the defendant would 
not be liable in an action in negligence.  See infra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 298. See, e.g., Sacks, supra note 156, at 1077–78. 
 299. See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of 
transferred intent); see also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL 
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 33(b) (2010) (“An actor who intentionally or recklessly causes 
harm is subject to liability for a broader range of harms than the harms for which the 
actor would be liable if only acting negligently.”); Mark Strasser, A Jurisprudence in 
Disarray:  On Battery, Wrongful Living, and the Right to Bodily Integrity, 36 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 997, 1001 (1999) (distinguishing battery from negligence on the ground that in 
battery, damages may be awarded even if not reasonably foreseeable; noting that the 
rationale for this distinction is that “intentional torts are viewed with more disfavor 
by the law than are merely negligent acts”). 
 301. See, e.g., Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389, 389 (La. 1987) (“[D]efendant’s 
liability [in battery] for the resulting harm extends . . . to consequences which the 
defendant did not intend, and could not reasonably have foreseen, upon the obvious 
basis that it is better for unexpected losses to fall upon the intentional wrongdoer 
than upon the innocent victim.”). 
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would recover neither for the indignity itself (because there is no 
general duty to avoid the merely negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, even severe emotional distress)302 nor for any resulting bodily 
harm (because such harm was unforeseeable).303  This concept of 
“transferred intent,” applicable in battery but not in negligence, 
includes not only liability for harmful bodily contacts when only 
offensive contacts were intended,304 but also liability for either 
harmful or offensive bodily contacts when only the apprehension of 
such a contact was intended.305  Even more significantly, in an action 
in battery, the plaintiff’s own negligence is no defense,306 whereas in 
an action in negligence, the plaintiff’s conduct could result in either 
non-liability or reduced liability, depending on which approach to 
comparative negligence the jurisdiction has adopted.307 
According to Professor Simons, these inconsistencies between 
battery and negligence actions may be irrelevant because the interests 
                                                          
 302. There is no general duty to avoid the merely negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, even severe emotional distress.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. 
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 46 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (stating that a 
defendant whose negligence causes serious emotional harm is subject to liability only 
when the plaintiff is placed in danger of immediate bodily harm or when the 
emotional harm occurs “in the course of specified categories of activities, 
undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially likely to cause 
serious emotional disturbance”). 
 303. A plaintiff may not recover if the harm was unforeseeable.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (2010) (setting forth 
that a defendant’s liability in negligence “is limited to those harms that result from 
the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious”).  The situation I am describing 
here is different from situations involving a so-called “eggshell skull” plaintiff, in 
which some physical harm was foreseeable, but the extent of the harm is not 
foreseeable.  See id. § 31 cmt. b.  The foreseeability of at least some physical harm is 
what makes the defendant liable, and the unforeseeable extent of the harm is 
typically considered only with respect to the measure of damages.  The eggshell skull 
doctrine is presumably justified by the administrative difficulty (and expense) of 
determining, in each case, what measure of damages was reasonably foreseeable.  In 
addition, victims of intentional torts such as battery—unlike victims of mere 
negligence—need not prove any actual damage, but rather are entitled to recover 
nominal damages.  See, e.g., Alan Calnan, The Fault(s) in Negligence Law, 25 QUINNIPIAC 
L. REV. 695, 729 (2007). 
 304. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Restatement 
definitions of intent). 
 305. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (defining both harmful battery and 
offensive battery); see also DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 40, at 75–77 (describing 
how transferred intent extends liability). 
 306. See, e.g., DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 200, at 498.  Recently, however, 
some courts and legislatures have recognized that comparative fault can be a defense 
to the intentional torts, in at least some situations.  See id. § 206, at 517–22; see also 
Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine:  Visions of a Restatement (Fourth) of Torts, 
50 UCLA L. REV. 585, 594–96 (2002) (urging radical reform of tort law in which 
intentional torts and negligence would be collapsed into a single principle based on 
fault). 
 307. See, e.g., DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, §§ 199–210, at 494–534 (describing 
the approaches to comparative negligence). 
MOORE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:20 PM 
2012] INTENT AND CONSENT IN THE TORT OF BATTERY 1639 
at stake are incommensurable.308  In other words, whereas battery 
protects against intentional invasions of personal dignity and bodily 
autonomy,309 negligence protects primarily against the unreasonable 
risk of physical harm.310  To some extent Professor Simons is correct, 
but the question remains whether the law should go as far as the 
single intent rule does in protecting the plaintiff’s interest in physical 
integrity.311 
The contours of battery have evolved over time, in response to 
modern conceptions of the appropriate basis for liability.  For 
example, it was once the case that battery included negligent as well 
as intentional bodily contacts, but no one involved in the single 
versus dual intent debate is arguing that liability in battery in such 
cases ought to be restored.312  Similarly, it was once the case that 
battery included cases in which the defendant intended neither harm 
nor offense, but there was nevertheless liability because of some other 
“unlawful” or “wrongful” aspect of the defendant’s conduct;313 
however, it is doubtful that anyone wants to return to such a vague 
and potentially overbroad formulation of battery’s requisite intent.314  
On what basis, then, is it fair to subject defendants to liability in 
battery absent any intent to offend or harm, in circumstances under 
which a defendant would not be liable in a negligence action? 315 
In partial response to this question, Professor Simons and other 
commentators note that there are other intentional torts, including 
                                                          
 308. Simons, supra note 6, at 1080–83 (noting that the legal standards for 
intentional torts and negligent torts are very different because they protect different 
interests). 
 309. DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 29, at 54 (“The central core of the battery 
rules is [that] the defendant must respect the plaintiff’s apparent wishes to avoid 
intentional bodily contact.”); Lawson, supra note 8, at 368 (stating that the “dignitary 
interest behind the tort of battery” is “the plaintiff’s interest in personal autonomy”); 
Simons, supra note 6, at 1070. 
 310. See Simons, supra note 6, at 1082 (comparing false imprisonment, which 
“most directly safeguards the interest in freedom from physical confinement, and 
only incidentally secures the more general interest in avoiding physical and 
emotional harm,” with negligence, which prohibits “causing physical harm by 
creating unreasonable risk”). 
 311. See id. at 1070 (“At a deeper level, the dispute between single- and dual-intent 
approaches is a dispute about how strongly battery law protects the interest in 
physical integrity . . . .”). 
 312. Outside of this debate, there are some commentators who would radically 
alter tort doctrine by collapsing intentional torts and negligence into a single tort 
that focuses upon the defendant’s fault.  See, e.g., Sugarman, supra note 306, at 594–
96; cf. Bublick, supra note 7, at 1350. 
 313. See supra notes 91–96 and accompanying text. 
 314. See, e.g., HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 15, at 29–30 (criticizing the circularity 
of the formulation of the intent requirement in battery); Lawson, supra note 8, at 
366–68 (rejecting “‘unlawful’ intent” as an appropriate basis for articulating the 
intent requirement in battery). 
 315. See FARNSWORTH & GRADY, TEACHERS’ MANUAL, supra note 268, at 12. 
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trespass to land and trespass to chattels, that entail a form of strict 
liability (and not even negligence).316  This is because a defendant 
will be liable for at least nominal damages even when the defendant 
reasonably believes that the  land or chattels belong to the 
defendant.317  There may be justifications for strict rules governing 
trespass to property that are not present with battery; for example, 
the trespass action may be used as a means of resolving disputed 
claims of ownership of real and personal property.318  However, there 
may also be aspects of those property torts that are similarly unjust—
such as the liability of a defendant for any harm caused by the 
defendant’s trespass to land or chattels, even when the defendant 
exercises reasonable or even the utmost care with respect to such 
harm319—and might be altered by a Third Restatement treatment of 
the intentional torts.  For example, Professor Bublick suggests that 
trespass to land and chattels might be better treated along with other 
property rules, rather than with the rules concerning intentional torts 
involving interests of personality.320  Professor Bublick also suggests 
that a new Restatement should distinguish between “core” cases in 
which the extended liability now available for intentional torts could 
apply and other “intentional torts” in which extended liability 
concepts of transferred intent and less strict causation standards 
would not apply.321  Thus, the strict liability aspects of trespass to land 
and chattels could remain available for nominal damages actions to 
determine ownership, but the defendants would not necessarily be 
strictly liable for all the resulting harm, no matter how unforeseeable.  
Professors Farnsworth and Grady posit three possible rationales for 
a single intent rule:  administrative convenience, deterrence, and an 
                                                          
 316. See Simons, supra note 6, at 1089 (noting that “[n]ot all intentional torts 
involve fault”); see also Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Tort Law, 87 
MARQ. L. REV. 903, 931–33 (2004); Sacks, supra note 156, at 1078. 
 317. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (defining “trespass to 
land” as the intentional entry or refusal to leave land that is “in the possession of 
[another]”); id. § 217 (defining “trespass to chattel” as intentional dispossession, use, 
or intermeddling with a chattel that is “in the possession of another”). 
 318. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 97, § 13, at 68 (“Since in the usual case the 
important question was the disputed title, and any technical invasion would serve as 
the basis of litigation to settle it, the rules as to the character of the tort itself tended 
to become fixed, and to remain so.” (footnote omitted)).  Although it may make 
sense to describe the offensive battery action as one designed to protect personal 
boundaries, it does not make sense to describe the action as one designed to resolve 
disputed boundary issues, as in the actions of trespass to land and trespass to chattels. 
 319. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 (1965) (trespass to land); id. § 218 
(trespass to chattels).  Coupled with the fact that the defendant may have reasonably 
believed that the land belonged to the defendant, see supra note 316 and 
accompanying text, this result seems unduly harsh. 
 320. Bublick, supra note 7, at 1349–50. 
 321. Id. at 1347–50. 
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intuition about fairness.322  The administrative convenience rationale 
involves the difficulty of proving the subjective intent of the 
defendant.323  This concern appears to be particularly strong in cases 
involving sexual boors.324  Professor Dobbs and others reject this 
argument on the ground that juries can be expected to reject 
testimony that is not credible,325 which should eliminate this concern 
in all but a handful of cases, some of which will involve children and 
the mentally disabled.326  As for deterrence, Professors Farnsworth 
and Grady suggest that, although people who act deliberately are 
more likely to be deterred than those who act inadvertently, it is 
unlikely that most people subject to a single intent rule would be 
aware of the rule outside of institutional settings like hospitals.327 
The intuitive fairness rationale appears to motivate most defenders 
of the single intent rule.  In the case of the sexual boor whom the 
jury believes honestly did not understand that his advances would be 
offensive, even Professor Dobbs, who otherwise supports the dual 
intent rule, appears to support liability.328  For example, Professor 
Dobbs assumes that a defendant might be found negligent when 
unwanted sexual contact results in harm, but he expresses apparent 
dismay that this “solution would leave the victim with no redress for 
merely offensive touchings if the jury believed the defendant had no 
intent to offend.”329  He then concludes that “[t]he best solution . . . 
                                                          
 322. See FARNSWORTH & GRADY, TEACHERS’ MANUAL, supra note 268, at 12. 
 323. Id. (noting that proving intent to touch is easier than proving intent to 
harm). 
 324. For example, Professor Glannon concludes that the defendant in a sexual 
boor hypothetical is likely to be held liable “even if he is too conceited to realize that 
this contact is offensive under the Restatement definition; the law will attribute to 
him an understanding of what the reasonable person finds offensive.”  GLANNON, 
supra note 238, at 15.  According to Professor Glannon, the reason for this is that 
“[o]therwise, he could avoid liability based on his testimony that he didn’t think it 
would be offensive,” and that “[s]uch a test would allow social boors to escape 
liability simply because they have poor judgment—or lie about what they 
understood—even though they inflict unwanted contact on others.”  Id. at 15–16. 
 325. See DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 59; King, supra note 3, at 649. 
 326. See, e.g., J.W. v. Utah, No. 2:05CV00968K, 2006 WL 1049112, at *1, *5 (D. 
Utah Apr. 19, 2006) (applying the single intent rule under Wagner to immunize the 
State against a battery claim when a six-year-old foster child committed sexual assault, 
even if the child was incapable of understanding the injurious or offensive nature of 
the contact), aff’d, 647 F.3d 1006 (10th Cir. 2011); see also infra notes 334–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 327. FARNSWORTH & GRADY, TEACHERS’ MANUAL, supra note 268, at 12. 
 328. Professor Dobbs first appeared to support the dual intent rule in his student 
treatise; that support has become clearer in the most recent edition of his 
practitioner treatise, in which he expressly acknowledges Professor Simons’s 
arguments in favor of the single intent rule and argues against them.  Compare DOBBS, 
HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 58–61, with DOBBS, PRACTITIONER TREATISE, supra 
note 21, § 35, at 90–92. 
 329. See DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 59.  Unlike Professor Dobbs, I 
argue that even when sexual contact results in harm, the defendant will not 
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may be to recognize that the plaintiff’s apparent lack of consent must 
be judged objectively” and “[i]f the plaintiff says, in words or deeds, 
‘Don’t touch me,’ and the defendant intentionally touches the 
plaintiff anyway, the defendant, not the plaintiff, must bear the cost 
of the defendant’s foolish belief that no means yes.”330  Although it is 
unclear why Professor Dobbs relies on the doctrine of apparent 
consent,331 his argument has been cited as supporting an 
interpretation of the element of intent that “may turn on a 
community standard insofar as the defendant is bound by community 
standards about what is reasonable and in accordance with social 
norms.”332 
The intuitive fairness rationale is most typically cited in connection 
with situations involving children and the mentally disabled, who are 
most likely to avoid liability as defendants under the dual intent 
rule.333  For example, in Wagner, the Supreme Court of Utah adopted 
the single intent rule in a case involving a mentally ill patient who 
physically attacked a stranger, reasoning the result of a refusal to do 
so would place “victims who were subjected to a harmful or offensive 
                                                          
necessarily be liable in negligence, particularly when the harm is unforeseeable.  See 
infra Part III.B.5. 
 330. DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 30, at 59.  Professor Dobbs does not 
explain how this approach can be squared with the dual intent rule.  Under that 
rule, the lack of apparent consent would be irrelevant, since the defendant, if his 
testimony is to be believed, did not have the requisite intent to harm or offend, 
regardless of whether his belief was reasonable or unreasonable. 
 331. The answer may be that, according to Professor Dobbs, in the absence of 
apparent consent, the defendant would have the requisite intent to offend.  See 
DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 29, at 55–56.  But this ignores the fact that intent 
is, by definition, subjective not objective.  Id. § 29, at 49.  Moreover, as previously 
argued, it makes more sense to separate the elements of intent and consent rather 
than to define one in terms of the other.  See supra Part III.C.  Under Professor 
Dobbs’s approach, the intent to offend becomes an example of single intent in the 
case of the sexual boor.  It is unclear whether his argument is limited to the case of 
the sexual boor, or whether it can be used in other instances as well. 
 332. Sacks, supra note 156, at 1077 n.127.  Professor Sacks interprets the Dobbs 
treatise to incorporate a notion of “constructive intent,” which according to her “is a 
concept that appears throughout our legal system and is based on the expectation 
that people in a society know or should know certain information in order to 
conform to legal requisites; it is no excuse if they are subjectively unaware of 
information of which they should be aware.”  Id.  Then, like Professors Henderson 
and Pearson, she says that “[s]ince the Restatement defines ‘offensive’ conduct by 
reference to objective, prevailing social usages, the defendant is bound by such even 
if she was unaware of the social usages or incorrectly subjectively believed that her 
conduct comported with social usages.”  Id.  But as I have posited earlier, this 
argument confuses the separate elements of result and intent.  See supra note 187 
(discussing the difference between result and intent). 
 333. In addition, governmental bodies and insurance companies will avoid liability 
under the single intent rule by taking advantage of the exclusion for intentional torts 
such as battery.  See supra notes 273–76 and accompanying text.  But this avoidance of 
liability seems to be directly contrary to the liability-extending rationale of many 
single-intent proponents.  See infra notes 349–55 and accompanying text. 
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physical contact at the mercy of those who deliberately come into 
contact with them, and must bear the costs of injuries inflicted 
thereby” and that “[t]he law would serve to insulate perpetrators of 
deliberate contact from the consequences their contact inflicts upon 
their victims.”334  This would not have been the case in Wagner itself 
because the attack there resulted in foreseeable physical harm; 
therefore, an action in negligence should have been available, and 
the mentally ill patient’s conduct would have been measured by the 
standard of the reasonable sane person.335  The court did not 
acknowledge this, and so it did not attempt to explain why an action 
in negligence would not suffice to compensate victims in similar cases 
involving foreseeable physical harm.336 
Admittedly, however, an action in negligence probably will not be 
available when physical harm was unforeseeable or when the result 
was limited to an offensive rather than a harmful bodily contact.337  
Even so, children and the mentally disabled will not necessarily 
escape liability for battery in many, perhaps even most cases.  All that 
is required is that a defendant intend either harm or offense, and 
both children and the mentally ill are often capable of both kinds of 
intent.338  Indeed, most of the published decisions involving these 
types of defendants present circumstances in which a jury could 
readily have concluded that the defendant had the requisite intent.  
This is particularly true when the contact is of a type that foreseeably 
will cause physical bodily harm, as in Wagner itself, where the mentally 
ill defendant, who had a history of violent conduct, “became violent, 
took [the plaintiff] by the head and hair, threw her to the ground, 
and otherwise acted in such a way as to cause serious bodily injury to 
her.”339  Given that the patient was apparently well enough at the time 
of the incident to participate in a public outing, a jury likely would 
have concluded that he intended to harm the plaintiff, although his 
                                                          
 334. Wagner v. Utah, 122 P.2d 599, 608 (Utah 2005). 
 335. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (describing the Second 
Restatement’s adoption of an objective standard for determining whether an actor 
breached the requisite standard of care in a negligence action).  The Wagner court 
cites relevant Restatement standards without indicating that they refer to an action in 
negligence, not an action in battery or any other intentional tort.  Wagner, 122 P.2d 
at 608 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965)). 
 336. It is ironic that labeling the patient’s conduct a battery in that case resulted in 
the inability of the victim to be compensated because the victim had sued the State, 
not the patient (who presumably had no assets), and the State was immune from 
liability based on an action arising in battery.  Id. at 610. 
 337. See supra notes 298–301 and accompanying text. 
 338. See, e.g., McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Mass. 1937) (holding that a 
patient had the required intent despite her mental illness). 
 339. Wagner, 122 P.2d at 601. 
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reasons for doing so were likely irrational.340 
Nevertheless, it must be conceded that there are some situations 
when adopting the dual intent rule will result in a defendant 
“escaping” liability.  In these cases, Professor Reynolds appears to 
adopt an intuitive fairness approach, arguing that although “the 
intent of the person causing unpermitted contact may not be so 
antisocial as to justify criminal liability, the contact surely violates the 
rule of society and of modern tort law that a person must keep his 
hands to himself.”341  He then concludes that “[t]he injured victim of 
violations of this rule deserves compensation.”342  Or, as the Wagner 
court concluded, “[t]he policy behind the [single intent rule] is to 
allow plaintiffs to recover from individuals who have caused them 
legal harm or injury, and to lay at the feet of the perpetrators the 
expense of their own conduct.”343  But the mere fact that the 
defendant “caused” the plaintiff’s harm has never been accepted as 
the sole or even primary basis for imposing what amounts to strict 
liability against a defendant, even though the result will be that some 
innocent victims will bear the cost of accidental injury.344  For 
example, because battery requires a voluntary act, a defendant who 
suffers an epileptic seizure and involuntarily strikes the plaintiff, 
causing foreseeably severe physical injuries, will not be liable either in 
negligence or in battery.345  The question then is on what basis a 
plaintiff “deserves” to be compensated when the defendant 
                                                          
 340. Id.; see also, e.g., Miele ex rel. Miele v. United States, 800 F.2d 50, 51–53 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (upholding immunity for the federal government under the Federal Torts 
Claim Act in a decision apparently adopting the single intent rule, but, noting that 
evidence that the mentally ill soldier had previously indicated hostility toward the 
plaintiff boy and his family could easily have resulted in jury finding that defendant 
intended harmful bodily contact); McGuire, 8 N.E.2d at 761, 763 (concluding that 
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant, who was insane 
and threatened to kill the plaintiff if she came into her room, intended to strike and 
injure the plaintiff).  In cases like Miele and Wagner, the significance of adopting the 
single intent rule is that the government is more likely to obtain a directed verdict, 
whereas adoption of the dual intent rule would make it more likely that the case 
would go to the jury, which might prefer to reject battery in order to provide the 
plaintiff with a remedy against the government.  As with other ancillary doctrines, the 
question of governmental immunity should not drive the court’s adoption of basic 
rules for an action in battery.  See supra notes 266–71 and accompanying text. 
 341. Reynolds, supra note 8, at 731. 
 342. Id. 
 343. Wagner, 122 P.3d at 610.  As previously noted, however, the use of the single 
intent rule in Wagner resulted in a finding of no liability because of the government’s 
immunity for conduct amounting to a battery.  See supra note 336. 
 344. Strict liability for defective products and abnormally dangerous activities 
requires facts other than mere causation and are justified by policy concerns specific 
to those particular situations.  See infra notes 345–48 and accompanying text. 
 345. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §2 cmt. a (1965) (explaining that an act 
must be voluntary); id. § 13 (noting that battery requires that the defendant act with 
the requisite intent). 
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deliberately touches the plaintiff, but intends neither harm nor 
offense.346  To permit the plaintiff to shift the cost of such accidents 
to the defendant is to elevate the plaintiff’s interest in “bodily 
integrity” and “bodily autonomy” to a higher level than perhaps it 
deserves in the twenty-first century.347 
C. Questioning the Modern Need for a Single Intent Rule 
Arguably, the tort of offensive battery is itself merely a vestige of 
the historical inability to distinguish between the levels of violence 
that might prompt retaliation and therefore a breach of the king’s 
peace.348  Modern commentators now rationalize offensive battery by 
recognizing the desire to protect the victim’s autonomy—that is, the 
right to decide whether and on what conditions to permit deliberate 
bodily touchings.349  But given that modern tort law now recognizes 
actions for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress,350 for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress,351 and for sexual 
harassment in the workplace,352 how far should courts be willing to go 
to protect either “bodily integrity” or “bodily autonomy”?  
Countervailing concerns include not only the defendant’s 
autonomy—that is, the freedom to engage in conduct, including 
deliberate touchings—that are not intended to harm or offend353—
                                                          
 346. See supra notes 328–36 and accompanying text (stating the rationale behind 
intuitive fairness). 
 347. See infra notes 349–54 and accompanying text (noting numerous sources of 
liability for violations of “bodily integrity” and “bodily autonomy”). 
 348. See, e.g., King, supra note 3, at 649 (“I believe that the mere intent to contact 
rule is an atavism of an outdated historical rationale for battery . . . .  The 
preservation of the peace rationale—whatever its original validity—has been obviated 
by criminal law and more developed social constraints.”); see also supra Part II 
(describing the historical evolution of the tort of battery). 
 349. See, e.g., DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 28, at 54 (“Battery today vindicates 
the plaintiff’s rights of autonomy and self-determination, her right to decide for 
herself how her body will be treated by others, and to exclude these invasions as a 
matter of personal preference, whether physical harm is done or not.”). 
 350. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965) (including liability for 
either intentionally or recklessly causing severe emotional distress by “extreme and 
outrageous conduct”). 
 351. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM 
§§ 46–48 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007); DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 308, at 
835–36. 
 352. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) (unlawful employment practices); Meritor Sav. 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986) (holding that sexual harassment creating a 
hostile or offensive work environment is a form of sex discrimination under Title 
VII). 
 353. See, e.g., King, supra note 3, at 649 (“A broader battery liability rule—one 
requiring only intent to cause a contact—could reciprocally impair the autonomy of 
not only potential defendants but of the broader society to engage in activities, 
without an equivalent enhancement of the autonomy of potential recipients of 
contacts.”). 
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but also the societal resources necessary to adjudicate these claims.354  
Given the existence of alternative forms of action that address the 
most egregious of the offensive battery cases, it may no longer be 
necessary or desirable to permit recovery for merely offensive bodily 
contacts, particularly when the defendant intends neither harm nor 
offense.355  In any event, it is questionable whether there is any 
continuing justification for subjecting such a defendant to liability for 
substantial physical harm in the absence of any wrongful intent.   
V. THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN MEDICAL BATTERIES 
A. The Majority Approach 
In most jurisdictions, a patient who did not consent to medical 
treatment has an action in battery against the physician, whereas a 
patient who consented, but whose consent was obtained without 
adequate information concerning the risks and benefits of the 
proposed treatment, is limited to an action in negligence.356  This 
distinction is important because in the battery action, the patient can 
recover for any harm caused by the treatment, whereas in the 
negligence action, the patient can recover only when the harm results 
from the undisclosed risk.357  It is unclear, however, whether the 
action in battery requires that the physician or other medical 
personnel know that there was no consent, or whether it is sufficient 
either that the patient did nothing to manifest consent or that the 
physician was unreasonable in believing that the patient consented.358  
                                                          
 354. It is probably true that most battery cases involve physical harm, even when 
the defendant intended merely an offensive touching, but there are a number of 
cases, including recent cases, in which the plaintiff sues for a merely offensive 
battery, sometimes in settings in which a court might conclude that the offense to the 
plaintiff is insufficient to warrant the resources necessary to adjudicate the claim.  See, 
e.g., Wishnatsky v. Huey, 584 N.W.2d 859, 862 (N.D. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that 
defendant’s “rude and abrupt” conduct in pushing an office door closed, thereby 
pushing the plaintiff back into the hallway, did not rise to the level of battery because 
it was not “offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity”). 
 355. See supra notes 353–54 and accompanying text. 
 356. See DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 103, at 242–43 (outlining the 
difference between actions in negligence and battery in medical cases). 
 357. See, e.g., Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 79 (N.J. 
2002) (noting that in an informed consent case, the plaintiff must prove “that a 
reasonably prudent patient in the plaintiff’s position would have declined to 
undergo the treatment if informed of the risks that the defendant failed to 
disclose”).  Further, nominal damages, as well as damages for mental anguish, are 
available in an action in battery.  See, e.g., Mink v. Univ. of Chi., 460 F. Supp. 713, 717 
(N.D. Ill. 1978).  Finally, as with cases outside the medical context, there are ancillary 
questions involving insurance coverage, statutes of limitations, and governmental 
immunity that will often turn on the distinction between the two actions.  See supra 
notes 272–77 and accompanying text. 
 358. See infra notes 383–89 and accompanying text (describing the need to clarify 
MOORE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:20 PM 
2012] INTENT AND CONSENT IN THE TORT OF BATTERY 1647 
The issue comes up in a variety of situations,359 including those in 
which the patient consented to the proposed treatment, but only on 
some condition.360  It also arises in situations involving a patient who 
consented to treatment, but the physician deviated from the scope of 
the express authorization because the physician thought it was in the 
patient’s best interests to do so.361  The issue also comes up in 
situations in which the patient consented to the proposed treatment, 
but the physician mistakenly performed a different treatment, such as 
inadvertently operating on the wrong leg, or mistakenly treated the 
wrong patient.362 
A majority of courts appear to require that physician must have 
deliberately deviated from the patient’s wishes before the physician 
will be held liable in battery.363  Others hold that a physician will be 
liable in battery whenever the patient has not, in fact, given either 
express or implied consent 364 Still others hold that, in at least some 
situations, medical personnel may reasonably rely on others in a 
position of authority who inform them that the patient has consented 
                                                          
the intent rule).  It is uniformly agreed that physicians are entitled to act in 
emergency, life-threatening situations, where there is either a form of presumed 
consent or a privilege to act in the patient’s best interests.  See, e.g., DOBBS, 
HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 106, at 247–48.  However, this exception will not apply 
where there is strong evidence that the patient would reject the proposed treatment, 
such as when a patient has given explicit instructions in a living will.  E.g., Allore v. 
Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (finding no battery where 
the treating physician and hospital were unaware of a living will directing that no life-
sustaining treatment be administered). 
 359. For an extensive discussion of the many contexts in which this question 
arises, see generally Allan H. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical 
Treatment, 41 MINN. L. REV. 381 (1957). 
 360. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900, 904 (Ct. App. 1991) (involving a 
plaintiff who requested that any blood transfusion come from a family member); 
Vitale v. Henchey, 24 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Ky. 2000); Perna v. Pirozzi, 457 A.2d 431, 433 
(N.J. 1983) (involving a plaintiff who requested that only a certain doctor be allowed 
to operate on her). 
 361. See, e.g., Pizzalotto v. Wilson, 437 So. 2d 859, 861–62 (La. 1983) (involving a 
patient who consented to an exploratory operation and a surgeon who removed her 
reproductive organs). 
 362. See, e.g., Moos v. United States, 225 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1955) (wrong leg 
and hip); Lane v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 850, 851 (E.D. Va. 1964) (wrong knee); 
see also Gill v. Selling, 267 P. 812, 813 (involving a doctor who operated on the wrong 
Mrs. Stone), aff’d en banc, 270 P. 411 (Or. 1928). 
 363. See FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE § 1.01[D], 
at 1-16 to -17 nn.18–19 (4th ed. Supp. 2012) (citing numerous cases in which the 
court came to this conclusion); see also AM. COLL. OF LEGAL MED., LEGAL MEDICINE 256 
(S. Sandy Sanbar et al. eds., 7th ed. 2007) (same). 
 364. See, e.g., Perna, 457 A.2d at 440 (involving a surgeon who performed an 
operation while unaware that the consent form named only a different surgeon); see 
also Vitale, 24 S.W.3d at 658 (involving a surgeon who believed he was authorized to 
perform the surgery, but who did not obtain that authorization from someone with 
the capacity to give consent on behalf of the patient). 
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to treatment by the defendant.365 
Many of these decisions do not give a reasoned explanation for 
their rulings, but merely rely on precedent regarding unauthorized 
medical treatment.366  Some of the decisions that require a deliberate 
deviation from the patient’s wishes in order for liability to attach 
apparently rest on the assumption that, in the absence of such a 
deviation, a physician lacks the requisite intent for battery.  This is 
described as either an intent to commit a “harmful or offensive” 
contact367 or as an “intentional unauthorized touching.”368  Although 
these courts do not directly address the single versus dual intent 
debate, they appear to adopt a form of dual intent requirement, in 
which the court views the known absence of consent as inextricably 
linked to the intent to make a contact known to be offensive.369  Still 
other decisions reflect a policy perspective unique to the medical 
context, citing concerns that:  (1) intentional torts might not be 
covered by the physician’s malpractice insurance; (2) punitive 
damages are more readily available in battery; and (3) absent an 
intentional deviation, the physician’s conduct essentially consists of 
an inadvertent deviation from the standard of conduct required of 
physicians and therefore should be addressed in a negligence action 
requiring expert testimony.370 
                                                          
 365. See, e.g., Mullins v. Parkview Hosp., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 608, 611 (Ind. 2007) 
(finding no battery because an emergency medical technician (EMT) student who 
performed an intubation was entitled to rely on her supervisor and anesthesiologist, 
who informed her that she had permission to perform an intubation on the 
unconscious patient); Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 565 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1997) (finding no battery where the treating physician and hospital were unaware of 
the existence of a living will directing no life-sustaining treatment be administered 
and where the patient’s general physician had entered an order in the patient’s chart 
directing immediate administration of resuscitation measures when necessary). 
 366. See, e.g., Moser v. Stallings, 387 N.W.2d 599, 604 (Iowa 1986). 
 367. See, e.g., Hogan v. Morgan, 960 So. 2d 1024, 1028 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (finding 
that because the physician was unaware of a court order limiting his examination of 
the patient, there was no evidence that he intended his examination to be either 
harmful or offensive). 
 368. See, e.g., Hulver v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 749, 752 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (“In 
order to have committed a battery, the defendant must have done some positive or 
affirmative act and that act must not only have caused but must have been intended to 
cause an unpermitted contact.” (emphasis added)), rev’d on other grounds, 562 F.2d 
1132 (8th Cir. 1977); Gaskin v. Goldwasser, 520 N.E.2d 1085, 1094–95 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1988). 
 369. See, e.g., Hulver, 393 F. Supp. at 752 (suggesting two required intents, one to 
do an act and another to intend harm). 
 370. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972); cf. Woolley v. Henderson, 418 
A.2d 1123, 1133 (Me. 1980) (limiting battery to “conscious disregard of the patient’s 
interest in his physical integrity” because such a rule “best accords with modern 
principles of medical malpractice favoring a single basis of liability predicated on 
fault and with the realities of the physician-patient relationship”); Ponholzer v. 
Simmons, 910 N.Y.S.2d 609, 610 (App. Div. 2010) (“[T]he [physician] is not one who 
acts antisocially as one who commits assault and battery, but is an actor who in good 
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Several commentators agree with the majority position that in 
medical cases, only the physician who deliberately deviates from the 
patient’s wishes should be held liable for battery.  Professor Lawson 
proposes that the prima facie case in all forms of battery, including 
medical cases, should be reformulated as the “intent to cause 
unauthorized bodily contact,” including an explicit requirement that 
the defendant know that the contact is unpermitted.371  In a slight 
variation of this position, Professor King proposes an elaborate test in 
which the defendant must intend harm or offense or, alternatively, 
know that consent is required and be “aware and contemporaneously 
cognizant of the absence of or deviation from the reasonably evident 
consent of the contemplated recipient [or that the defendant] did 
not honestly believe he had valid consent.”372  This alternative 
formulation—which is too convoluted to be useful—appears to apply 
primarily in medical and other “helpful intent” cases.373  
B. The Majority View as Inconsistent with the Second Restatement’s 
 Approach to Consent 
Although the majority position is almost certainly justifiable from a 
public policy point of view in cases involving physicians and other 
medical personnel,374 it is apparently inconsistent with battery 
doctrine as it generally applies outside the medical context.  For 
example, courts in other types of cases have not stated explicitly that 
the defendant must be aware of the plaintiff’s lack of consent.375  
                                                          
faith intends to confer a benefit on the patient.” (second alteration in original) 
(quoting Dries v. Gregor, 424 N.Y.S.2d 561, 564 (App. Div. 1980))).  For actions 
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, courts have also found that while a 
physician who mistakenly operates on the wrong body part might have committed a 
“technical battery,” Congress did not mean to immunize the Government except 
when the defendant committed an “intentional wrongful act,” such as intentional 
deviation from the patient’s consent.  See, e.g., Lane v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 
850, 853 (E.D. Va. 1964). 
 371. See Lawson, supra note 8, at 368–81, 384. 
 372. See King, supra note 3, at 644 (footnote omitted). 
 373. Id. at 647 (applying the alternative formulation to a case involving a dental 
surgeon).  Medical cases are the ones in which potential defendants are most likely 
to be conscious of the need to obtain explicit consent before performing invasive 
examinations or treatments.  This formulation might also be used in cases involving 
sexual boors.  See supra notes 328–32 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.  One early commentator 
recommended an even more radical departure from the standard applied in non-
medical cases, arguing that assault and battery should be limited to cases in which 
the physician has engaged in “an intentional deviation from practice which does not 
tend to be beneficial to the patient.”  McCoid, supra note 359, at 434.  In all other 
cases, liability would be based on “deviation from the standard of conduct of a 
reasonably prudent doctor.”  Id.  Under this proposal, battery would presumably be 
limited to egregious cases such as those involving sexual touchings of an unconscious 
or sedated patient. 
 375. See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text (detailing cases in which single 
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Indeed, this position is inconsistent with the single intent rule, which 
requires only that the defendant intend a bodily contact that turns 
out to be either harmful or offensive.  Perhaps more importantly, this 
position appears to be contradicted by Section 892 of the Second 
Restatement, which provides that consent can be either actual or 
apparent and that apparent consent consists of “words or conduct 
[that] are reasonably understood . . . to be intended as consent.”376  
In other words, a battery is committed if the defendant has the 
requisite intent and the patient does or says nothing that the 
reasonable physician would interpret as consent.377  So, for example, 
under the Second Restatement provisions, if a physician mistakenly 
operates on a patient’s left knee when the patient consents to an 
operation on the right knee, the physician would be liable for a 
battery because there was intent to make a harmful bodily contact 
and it is hard to imagine circumstances in which a jury would be 
permitted to find even apparent consent to an operation on the 
wrong knee.378  Under the majority approach, however, the physician 
will not be liable, so long as she sincerely believes that she is operating 
on the correct knee and does not knowingly deviate from the 
patient’s wishes. 
The majority rule is inconsistent with Section 892 of the Second 
Restatement because the majority rule does not acknowledge liability 
for battery when a physician unreasonably believes that the patient has 
consented to the particular contact.  However, the Second 
Restatement position may itself be problematic because under 
section 892A the consent must be “by one who has the capacity to 
consent or by a person empowered to consent for him.”379  As a 
result, the Restatement apparently does not allow for a treating 
physician to reasonably rely on other physicians to determine 
                                                          
intent rule was used without reference to lack of consent). 
 376. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) (1979).  Actors such as physicians 
are also privileged in emergency circumstances in which the actor has no reason to 
believe that the other person would, if asked, refuse to consent.  Id. § 892D. 
 377. Section 892 also makes it clear that it is the patient or the patient’s 
authorized representative who must give either actual or apparent consent.  Id. § 
892D(a).  For a discussion of whether this restricted concept of apparent consent 
makes sense, particularly in the medical concept, see infra notes 379–82 and 
accompanying text. 
 378. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. d (1979) (using these 
precise facts as illustration for the need to adhere to the terms of the consent given).  
There are, however, cases in which courts permit juries to determine the appropriate 
scope of the consent given by the patient.  See, e.g., Kaplan v. Mamelak, 75 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 861, 868 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a jury must determine “whether operating 
on the wrong disk within inches of the correct disk is a ‘substantially different 
procedure’” than the one authorized by the patient). 
 379. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(a) (1979). 
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whether the patient has consented to the proposed treatment.  Some 
medical battery cases have allowed patients to recover, despite the 
fact that the defendants may have reasonably relied on another 
physician’s advice that the patient consented, because the other 
physician was not empowered to consent on the patient’s behalf.380  
These defendants would have prevailed under the majority rule—
which requires deliberate deviation from a patient’s wishes—as well 
as in jurisdictions that allow physicians and other medical personnel 
to reasonably rely on others.381   
As a matter of policy, it may not be feasible or sensible to require 
each and every member of a medical treatment team to personally 
investigate and determine whether consent has been given whenever 
a team member touches the patient in a way that would be either 
harmful or offensive in the absence of effective consent.382  The 
question then arises whether an exception to the Second 
Restatement provisions on consent should be limited to medical 
batteries or extended to other cases. 
C. The Rationale for Deviating from the Second Restatement’s Approach to 
 Consent  
The majority rule excluding battery in medical cases unless the 
physician deliberately departs from the patient’s wishes may be 
justified for public policy reasons unique to the medical context, 
including the necessity of permitting physicians to reasonably rely on 
other medical personnel in determining whether or not the patient 
has consented to a particular procedure.  Outside of the medical 
context, however, it may be unduly harsh to exclude from battery 
those cases in which a defendant believes that the plaintiff has 
consented, but that belief is unreasonable.383  As a result, it would be 
preferable for courts to not only separate the intent and consent 
                                                          
 380. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 365. 
 381. See King, supra note 3, at 644; Lawson, supra note 8, at 368–69. 
 382. I am not talking about the types of touching that are impliedly consented to 
when a patient consents to be admitted to a hospital or to be examined by a 
physician.  Rather, I am focused on other contexts—for example, major operations—
for which additional and specific consent is typically required.  In these situations, 
there are frequently many members of the treatment team (including other doctors, 
medical students, and nurses) who will intentionally contact the patient in ways that 
are invasive and therefore would be offensive in the absence of consent.  I doubt that 
each member of these teams routinely examines the patient’s written informed 
consent before participating in the operation. 
 383. For example, in the sexual context, a defendant may sincerely believe that 
when the plaintiffs says “no” she really means “yes”; nevertheless, the jury should be 
permitted to conclude that the defendant’s belief was unreasonable and that the 
plaintiff should therefore recover in battery.  See DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 
30, at 59. 
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elements,384 but also to clarify that requiring knowing departure from 
the patient’s wishes is a special rule invoked in cases involving 
consent in the context of medical care. 
There is, however, at least one apparent departure from Sections 
892 and 892A that might warrant extension to non-medical cases, and 
that is the defendant’s ability to rely on circumstances other than the 
words or conduct of the plaintiff herself in order to invoke the 
privilege of consent.  It is not clear that defendants should be 
required, in all cases, to determine consent solely on the basis of the 
plaintiff’s own words or conduct.  Perhaps defendants should be 
permitted to act when, under all of the circumstances, they 
reasonably believe that a plaintiff with the capacity to do so has 
consented to the contact.385  For example, in recreational sports 
cases, a defendant might believe that a written consent purportedly 
executed by the plaintiff (or by someone authorized to act on the 
plaintiff’s behalf) is legitimate, but it might turn out to be a forgery. 
So long as the defendant’s reliance is reasonable under the 
circumstances, there is no reason why the defendant should be liable 
in battery.  The same logic would apply in cases involving mistaken 
identity.386  It may be that mistaken identity cases in a medical context 
will almost always involve negligence on the part of a physician,387 but 
the same is not necessarily true of other, less formal contacts, such as 
a man who comes up behind a woman he reasonably believes to be 
his wife and gives her a hug, only to find out that she is a stranger 
wearing the same coat that his wife was wearing that morning.  If a 
defendant may act reasonably in self-defense, taking into account all 
                                                          
 384. Supra Part III.C. 
 385. According to Professor Dobbs, the defendant’s reasonable belief that the 
plaintiff has the capacity to consent is already acknowledged as an appropriate basis 
to involve the consent doctrine.  See DOBBS, HORNBOOK, supra note 9, § 24, at 49.  He 
does not discuss statutory rape; however, I presume he would acknowledge that 
courts will invoke statutory rape legislation as creating an exception to the apparent 
consent doctrine, thereby rendering a minor’s consent ineffective regardless of 
whether the defendant reasonably believed she was of age. 
 386. Under section 892 of the Second Restatement, a defendant may be justified 
in believing that the intended recipient of an otherwise offensive touching has 
consented through a pattern of past practices.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
892 (1979).  Under section 892A, however, if the defendant is mistaken as to the 
identity of the actual recipient, the defendant could not invoke the apparent consent 
doctrine.  Id. § 892A.  Under my proposed rule, however, a defendant may invoke 
the doctrine of apparent consent so long as the defendant acted reasonably under 
the circumstances. 
 387. See, e.g., Gill v. Selling, 267 P. 812, 813 (involving a physician who performed 
a spinal test on the wrong patient, who had been mistakenly called in from the 
waiting room by nurse who did not even inquire as to the patient’s identity), aff’d en 
banc, 270 P. 411 (Or. 1928). 
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of the attendant circumstances,388 then it is far from clear why 
consent should be limited to conduct manifested only by the words 
or conduct of the plaintiff.389  This question ought to be given serious 
consideration in any attempt to clarify and rationalize the law of 
consent in battery and other intentional tort actions, which I believe 
the ALI ought to do in the Third Restatement. 
CONCLUSION 
Close examination of applicable case law reveals considerable 
confusion and controversy concerning the law of battery, which is the 
most prominent of all the intentional torts.  Commentators and 
courts have not yet recognized the full extent of this confusion, which 
encompasses not only the debate between single and dual intent, but 
also the relationship between intent and the absence of consent.  The 
relationship between intent and consent is of particular concern in 
medical battery cases, in which the majority of courts are applying 
rules that may make sense, but that may be unique to that context.  
Further, there has been little examination of the precise contours of 
the doctrine of consent, particularly the ability of a defendant to 
reasonably rely on circumstances other than the words or conduct of 
the plaintiff or someone authorized to give consent on the plaintiff’s 
behalf.  Again, this is a particular concern involving physicians and 
other medical personnel, where it may not be feasible for each 
member of a treating team to personally investigate the existence and 
scope of the patient’s consent.  
The ALI is clearly mistaken in concluding that intentional tort 
doctrine is clear and that the Second Restatement’s intentional tort 
provisions have been widely adopted.  As a result, the ALI should 
reconsider its decision not to extend the Third Restatement to the 
intentional torts.  It has not been my intention to propose detailed 
language for any such Third Restatement provisions, including those 
concerning battery.  Indeed, before addressing those provisions, the 
ALI would need to give serious consideration to the suggestion there 
should be a radical reformulation of the intentional tort doctrine 
                                                          
 388. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 63–65 (1965) (the two primary 
provisions on the use of self-defense). 
 389. Treating consent as different from other defenses, such as the affirmative 
defense of self-defense, may derive from the “ancient legal maxim, volenti non fit 
injuria, meaning that no wrong is done to one who consents.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. a (1979).  This may explain why lack of consent is 
typically viewed as an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case and why actual 
consent, even when not manifested to the defendant, operates as a complete 
defense. 
MOORE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 8/27/2012  12:20 PM 
1654 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1585 
along the lines suggested by Professor Bublick and others.390 
If, however, the ALI considers and rejects any such radical 
reformulation, then I suggest the following with respect to the 
provisions relating to the tort of battery:  First, the prima facie case in 
battery should be maintained in its present formulation—what is 
required is an act, done with intent to cause a harmful or offensive 
bodily contact (or imminent apprehension of such contact), that in 
fact causes either harmful or offensive bodily contact.  Second, the 
comment should clarify that, with respect to the intent to cause a 
harmful or offensive bodily contact, both intent to cause bodily 
contact and intent to cause harm or offense thereby are required.  
Third, the comment and illustrations should clarify that with respect 
to medical and other “helpful intent” situations, operations constitute 
harmful bodily contacts (even if they are ultimately beneficial) and 
that invasive bodily procedures and similar non-trivial bodily 
touchings are typically offensive when done without the patient’s 
consent.  As a result, physicians and other medical personnel will 
almost certainly know that, in the absence of consent, medical 
treatment commonly involves either harmful or offensive contact.  
Therefore, these cases will typically turn on the presence or absence 
of actual or apparent consent.  Fourth, the ALI should decide 
whether to include absence of consent as an element of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case, or alternatively, to specify that consent (either actual 
or apparent) is an affirmative privilege or defense.391  Fifth, the 
provisions should expressly provide that, in cases involving medical 
treatment, medical personnel are not liable in battery unless they 
intentionally deviate from the patient’s wishes.  And finally, the ALI 
should also consider whether, in cases outside the medical arena, 
defendants should be able to establish consent based on their 
reasonable belief, under all of the circumstances, that the plaintiff is 
consenting. 
Confronting the issues raised in this Article will require the ALI 
(and others) to address very basic questions concerning the 
underlying nature of intentional torts, including the extent to which 
those torts should reflect the fault principle that underlies most of 
modern tort law.  I look forward to participating in the debate. 
                                                          
 390. Supra notes 306–21 (discussion of Bublick’s and Sugarman’s proposals). 
 391. I believe the better position is to make consent an affirmative defense, just 
like self-defense, defense of others, and defense of property.  It is unclear to me why 
consent functions differently, given that it is not limited to actual consent but 
includes apparent consent, which is very much like the reasonableness tests of other, 
clearly affirmative defenses. 
